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Abstract 
This thesis examines how writers negotiate the subject positions in which 
the public act of writing places them. The works of Michel Foucault, Yukio 
Mishima and Jeanette Winterson demonstrate how writers may foreground 
their resistance towards discursive penetration despite an ostensibly 
confessional stance, and establish their works as a site where deliberate 
incoherence, as much as much, can be produced. In Chapter 1, I argue 
that Foucault’s works demonstrate the importance of considering the self-
representing subject in his works. Focusing on Mishima’s Confessions of a 
Mask and Winterson’s Oranges Are Not the Only Fruit, I argue in Chapter 
2 that the identifiability of autobiographical elements in the works 
reinforces the paradox of authenticity and façade that the novels present. 
In Chapter 3, I argue that Mishima and Winterson further problematize 
authorial control through more complex works of self-revelation, 
highlighting both the necessity and inevitability of interpretation and the 
potential violence it entails.
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Introduction: Out, But Where? 
 “[E]very time I go into a Borders, I move a few books from the gay 
fiction shelf to the general fiction section, restoring them to their rightful 
place in the alphabetical and promiscuous flow of literature.” (Leavitt) 
 
Beyond what goes on in bookstores, what Leavitt implies is that, as a 
category of identification, the prominence of queer subjectivities should be 
reduced and integrated with others who do not seem to be categorized 
according to sexual orientation. It is fairly easy to understand Leavitt’s 
reluctance to see “gay fiction” being placed on a separate shelf, as though 
sexuality takes precedence over all else as a primary category of 
subjectivity, especially when it comes to queer sexualities. This is firstly 
limiting to those who openly identify themselves as gay but see sexual 
orientation as only a facet of their identities and it would seem as though 
the works of gay writers are invariably about sexuality. Secondly, and 
more importantly, the continued separation and prominence of queer 
sexualities in general, ensures that queer sexualities will never be equal to 
heterosexuality because they are publicly circulated as a separate 
category (there are no shelves for heterosexual fiction, one might note), 
perhaps even as a curious spectacle. Leavitt is not suggesting, however, 
that queerness withdraws into the closet and disappears without a trace of 
its existence—he wants gay fiction on the shelves but not on a separate 
shelf and he does not see a reason to give a separate category to fiction 
by gay writers or with gay characters. Other than raising the question of 
what the place of queer sexualities should be out of the closet, what 
Leavitt says also reminds us that books, perhaps fiction in particular, are 
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an instrument through which discourses of identity are circulated and 
perpetuated. 
 One condition that has made it possible for queer sexualities to 
exist as a separate category, not only in bookstores but also in societies in 
general, is the acts of self-revelation in literature. Such acts may be 
intended as self-assertion, a claim to legitimacy or a challenge to 
discrimination. However, it is also through the repetition of such 
assertions that the categories are produced and accepted as truth. 
It is possible to examine the practices of self-revelation as self-
narration or self-authorship that involves not only the revelation or 
representation of individuals, but also the production and reconfiguration 
of subjectivities, probing the cultural conditions and circumstances that 
allow or even encourage such practices. 
Writing and other practices of revealing the self are commonly 
understood as practices whereby private lives are brought to the view of 
the public and whereby otherwise concealed facets of individuals are 
exposed. However, it also takes a certain degree of naivety for one to 
believe that self-revelatory texts can generally be treated as transparent, 
straightforward records that are transmitted from authorial selves to an 
audience that can access the subjects represented in the texts without 
any representative or interpretive distortions made by either the author or 
the reader. The author that ostensibly writes to reveal certain aspects of 
himself or his life, by performing an act of selection, inevitably offers an 
incomplete and even inaccurate epistemology of the self. More could be 
studied about the matrix of relations between the person who happens to 
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write (the subject that would exist even without any writing), the writer as 
a public figure, the text or representation and the reader who receives 
and interprets. 
Instead of taking self-revelation to be an act of autonomous self-
assertion, one can analyze self-revelation in terms of the relations and 
gaps between the speaking or writing subject, the representation, and the 
interpretation involving an audience or a reader. As aesthetics or as an 
act of representation, a text that reveals the self embodies a paradox: if 
the act off writing is itself a part of the process of subject formation (or 
transformation) or self-fashioning, the text, then, is not just a site of 
revelation but also a site of production. Texts of self-revelation might 
stand as a testimony to a self that is being reconstituted by the act of 
revelation without sufficiently or directly representing the reconstituted 
self. In other words, representations will always be inadequate because 
the act of representing redefines the represented. [A strategy of elusion?] 
A text of self-revelation can serve as an unstable signifier of the self that 
inhabits various positions, including the positions of the represented 
subject of the text, the self-fashioning subject in the process of producing 
the text, and the subject that has made the text possible. 
One might locate self-revelation within an impulse in broader socio-
cultural practices. Writings about the self can be seen as an instance of a 
modern confessional impulse, particularly as regards sexuality. In the 
works of Michel Foucault, there is a recurring concern with various 
practices of self-revelation that can come under the notion of confession 
in its broadest sense. Foucault sees confession in Western societies as a 
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widespread practice originating from a traditionally Christian technique, 
but which has diffused into various secular, institutionalized practices. The 
traditionally Christian mode of confessing to a religious figure is now no 
longer merely a religious practice, but has evolved and become 
paradigmatic of various aspects of modern (Western) culture, including 
the confession of patients to psychiatrists and the confessions of criminals 
in court.  
In a series of lectures Foucault gave at the Collège de France (1974-
1975), translated and published posthumously under the title Abnormal 
(English translation). Foucault highlighted how the modern judicial 
process harnesses medical and psychiatric knowledge to prove guilt via 
discourses is an impulse to confess which does not lie isolated within 
certain medical or juridical institution, but which is fostered by a more 
general socio-cultural ethos. In Foucault's words: 
If we go to the psychiatrist, psychoanalyst, or sexologist so 
frequently to consult them about our sexuality, it is precisely 
to the extent that all kinds of mechanisms everywhere—in 
advertising, books, novels, films, and widespread 
pornography—invite the individual to pass from this daily 
expression of sexuality to the institutional and expensive 
confession of his psychiatrist, psychoanalyst, or sexologist. 
(170) 
Where Foucault is concerned, scientific (or pseudo-scientific) discourses of 
sexuality with accompanying discourses regarding normality have given 
rise to the figure of the expert such as the psychiatrist. The authority of 
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the expert on matters such as sanity does not work by strict imposition; 
instead, it has seeped into a general public consciousness, shaping the 
way human subjectivity is instinctively understood. Notably, for both the 
Christian confession and the clinical confession, "Expert" authority is not a 
quality inherent to the priest or to the psychiatrist. These subjects of 
authority are, in fact, governed by their respective epistemologies of 
truth, namely God in the case of the Christian confession, and scientific or 
medical knowledge in the case of the clinical confession. In this sense, all 
individuals can be said to play certain subject functions in the web of 
power relations. 
Foucault provides a more sustained development of the ideas 
relating to sexuality, confession and the productivity of power in The 
History of Sexuality. In The History of Sexuality: An Introduction, he 
examines the transformation of "sex" into discourse. In the seventeenth 
century, Christianity had made it an "obligation" to translate all aspects of 
sexuality into speech, although the "scheme for transforming sex into 
discourse had been devised long before in an ascetic and monastic 
setting" (20). The use of language (speech) to represent or express 
oneself becomes a primary mechanism of power. Foucault points out that 
"[a]n imperative was established: Not only will you confess to acts 
contravening the law, but you will seek to transform your desire, your 
every desire into discourse" (21). It is by no means solely a matter of 
transforming desire into discourse, but also a matter of transforming 
desire itself (and, by extension, subjectivity) by so doing: 
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This is the essential thing: that Western man has been drawn 
for three centuries to the task of telling everything concerning 
his sex, that since the classical age there has been a constant 
optimization and an increasing valorization of the discourse on 
sex; and that this carefully analytical discourse was meant to 
yield multiple effects of displacement, intensification, 
reorientation, and modifications of desire itself. (23) 
By speaking of one's sexual desires, however, the effect is not (or at least 
not always) the suppression of desires. Rather, it is as though certain 
facets of one's sexuality are amplified by confession, perhaps at the 
expense of other facets of sexuality because the counterpart of 
confessional revelations is their elisions. From another perspective, one 
might see that although subjectivity can be amorphous and inscrutable, it 
has increasing been delimited into convenient, examinable compartments 
that facilitate the proliferating processes of governmentality characteristic 
of Western modernity. It is also by emphasizing selected aspects of one's 
subjectivity that other facets recede. In Abnormal, Foucault reminds us 
that "confession as a procedure of power is . . . primary and fundamental 
and it is around this practice . . . that the rule of silence is able to 
function. [C]ensorship is . . . a negative process governed by a positive 
mechanism" (169). To carry the idea further, there is no discursive free 
play, and the constitution of the self within discourse involves a 
delimitation of the self to a specific locus. 
The productivity of power in creating multiple subject positions to 
be inhabited by individuals through their participation in discourses of the 
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self seems to simultaneously open up possibilities for individual identity 
while also consigning individuals to various positions of relative fixity. One 
could note a shift from the Christian model of confessing specific sins—
transgressive actions or desires—in detail, where the confession is meant 
to signify a clean break from sin. The aesthetics of self-revelation, instead 
of being separate and distinguishable from the represented actions or 
desires, can be seen as an extension—a continuation— of the actions or 
desires revealed, perhaps expanding the regimes of pleasure involved. 
Rather than being "terminal" or inhibitive, such modern practices of 
confession, drawing from institutionalized knowledge and practices, allow 
for the recollection, reiteration and intensification of the confessed actions 
or desires. The act of confession concretizes that which is confessed via 
medical truths or knowledge; the confessing self is then given definition 
via such knowledge. To make claims about one's sexuality through 
scientific expertise, for instance, is to situate oneself within the categories 
used by scientific discourses. Thus, while there are multiple avenues of 
self-revelation, the self also becomes isolated to and confined within 
positions penetrable by dominant knowledge. In contemporary culture, 
one may see the manifestation of this paradox in much of the politics 
involving identity (movements such as gay activism). The tendency of 
identity politics to neglect difference has already been pointed out by 
thinkers like Angelia Wilson (A Simple Matter of Justice?). To problematize 
it further, a call for equality or an attempt to "naturalize" the status of 
certain groups of people in society often invokes precisely the categories 
that serve to isolate and set these groups apart. While this does not 
necessarily mean that such action is doomed to futility form the start, it 
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underscores the problematic nature of certain modes of resistance in 
discourse. 
More specifically, in literature, the "coming out" narratives of gay 
and lesbian writers may be yet another instance of how confessional 
practices are implicated in such a paradox. In the words of Toni McNaron: 
As members of a historically invisible minority, lesbians and 
gay men have routinely had difficulty positioning ourselves, 
partly because we have no language with which to do so and 
partly because the larger culture has supplied not acceptable 
mirrors or images by which to fashion ourselves. (Internet 
resource) 
McNaron echoes Foucault, who points out in the first volume of The 
History of Sexuality that the discourses of sexuality "also made possible 
the formation of a 'reverse' discourse: homosexuality began to speak in 
its own behalf, to demand that its legitimacy or 'naturality' be 
acknowledge, often in the same vocabulary, using the same categories by 
which it was medically disqualified" (101). William Turner, similarly, 
rephrases Foucault but with greater care not to emphasize that the 
medical categories have to be recognized as problematic: "The protocols 
for 'scientific' descriptions of 'homosexuals' provided the opportunity for 
'homosexuals' to adopt a group identity and respond on their behalf" (54). 
Yet, even with Turner's qualifying quotation marks when he uses 
the term "homosexuals," the viability of a counter-discourse that might be 
naively dependent on the discursive categories that have served as 
functions of power is questionable and, indeed, questioned, by Foucault. 
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In contrast to McNaron, in Epistemology of the Closet, Sedgwick (who also 
works with Foucault's ideas) points out that "'Closetedness' itself is a 
performance initiated as such by the speech act of a silence . . . that 
surrounds and differentially constitutes it" (3). McNaron's metaphor of 
invisibility does not quite capture the situation. The marginality of gays 
and lesbians is not exactly a state of invisibility that can be easily 
overcome by rendering this group of people visible. To begin with, a truly 
"invisible" group would not be identifiable in discourse. If gays and 
lesbians have been marginalized in Western culture, it is because the rise, 
popularization and naturalization of the category of homosexuality, 
together with accompanying discourses of morality or normality, have 
discursively identified and singled out—rendered invisible, in other 
words—a group of individuals as homosexuals. As such the move of 
coming out, in fact, enhances the visibility of an already visible group. The 
individual writer who comes out as a gay or a lesbian is compelled to 
partake in and propagate (through the medium of writing) the very 
discourses that have also served to marginalize them, while perhaps also 
believing that their participation in these discourses is liberating. Self-
revelation is, in the words of Sedgwick, a "disclosure at once compulsory 
and forbidden" (70). 
For the writer of coming out narratives in particular, coming out 
also signifies his or her entrance into the public as a gay or lesbian writer. 
From McNaron's perspective, the writer of coming out narrative is 
asserting individual uniqueness while integrating with a group: "I assert 
my specialness at exactly the same moment as I identify with and affirm a 
group." (Internet resource) From another perspective, coming out ma not 
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always be a matter of group solidarity but could serve to critique the 
workings of the group itself as "narratives about coming out reflect, 
constitute, and challenge the cultural norms of the gay and lesbian 
community" (Bacon 252). Furthermore, if one considers specifically the 
published and publicized accounts of coming out, it is clear that more is 
involved that self-assertion and identification since the public consists of 
more than the group with which the individual identified. If there already 
is a certain public gaze on the gay and lesbian community, a coming out 
narrative may be seen as an invitation to focus the gaze upon individual 
writers. 
Yet writers who engage in a mode of self-revelation do not write 
only "coming out" narratives or narratives that reveal their sexuality, if 
they do so at all. As suggested earlier, acts of self-revelation need not be 
taken as terminal acts resolving issues of the self. They can, instead, 
produce further possibilities of revealing or reconfiguring the self and the 
self as writer. One may also make a further distinction between 
confessions in literature and other art forms and confessions facilitated by 
discourses of medical or juridical institutions. If the patient/psychiatrist 
relationship seems to be an extension of the sinner/priest model of 
confession (because both models involve individuals subjecting 
themselves to the gaze of figures in whom authority is invested), 
literatures of confession seem to offer a somewhat different model. With 
the literary confession, there is no one gazer, but a heterogeneous public 
without a fixed source of "authority." 
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If a self-revealing writer establishes a public persona through a 
confessional work, it may be useful to consider the broader range of work 
that he or she has produced in order to investigate how the public 
persona could be exploited, negotiated and reinvented. This thesis will 
embark on such an investigation through the works of Yukio Mishima and 
Jeanette Winterson. 
It is perhaps not immediately apparent why I am bringing together 
these two writers. Mishima, a Japanese writer writing after the Second 
World War, is widely known for his death by seppuku (Japanese ritual 
suicide) in 1970. Winterson, on the other hand, is a British writer whose 
first novel was published in 1985. Yet despite the obvious differences in 
the cultural backgrounds of the two writers and even in the eras in which 
they live, they share certain similarities. Both writers started gaining 
literary recognition and public awareness from works that are arguably 
autobiographical. For Winterson, it was her first novel, Oranges are Not 
the Only Fruit. For Mishima, it was his second novel and first significant 
published work, Confessions of a Mask, which was published in 1948. 
Much of Mishima’s novel deals with various aspects of the protagonist’s 
sexuality, and the protagonist’s experiences are often replications of 
Mishima’s own. The same goes for Winterson, while Oranges is about a 
girl bought up in a fanatically religious family and who has to come to 
terms with her sexuality. Both writers, however, do not see their works as 
straightforward autobiographies. 
 Works that are partly autobiographical and those that play with the 
conventions of the autobiography and other genres are by no means 
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unique to Mishima and Winterson. Prominent examples include Gertrude 
Stein’s The Autobiography of Alica B. Toklas, which was published in 
1933, and Sylvia Plath’s The Bell Jar, which was published in 1963. The 
situation for Mishima and Winterson, however, is more peculiar even if it 
is not strictly unique. Because of the self-revelatory works that gained 
them prominence as writers, both Mishima and Winterson have to deal 
with the expectations their autobiographical novels set in the public. It is 
easy for them to be taken as queer, confessional writers when their 
writings could be more complex. Both writers take a turn to increasing 
self-reflexivity and their works become increasingly stylized, often dealing 
with various aspects of the reader/writer relationship. While we may start 
approaching the works of the writers from the perspective of queer or 
marginalized sexualities, we can end up with the realization that the 
“queer” is likely to represent merely an instance of a more general issue 
of subjectivity that the writers concern themselves with. In many of their 
works, they suggest an awareness of and an engagement with or even a 
resistance towards the way their works are received and circulated. 
 The issue I wish to deal with is not just the matter of how writers 
reinvent their public personae. Instead, the involvement of confession 
(and by extension, sexuality, given the close association between 
confession and sexuality is also critical. There is often a high degree of 
self-reflexivity. One could start by examining the disclosure of oneself 
through the production of narratives of the self that are publicly 
circulated. This could be followed by an examination of how self-revelation 
is self-reflexively negotiated within a writer’s oeuvre. The shifting 
positionalities that the confessing subject occupies can then also serve as 
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a domain of analysis. The works of writers like Mishima and Winterson 
serve to constantly reformulate how the writers’ subjectivities are 
understood and received by the public, undermining reductive labels such 
as “the lesbian”. I will argue that through self-reflexive moves that 
interrogate the stakes of self-revelation or confession, Mishima and 
Winterson create and occupy multiple subject positions, thus reconfiguring 
and undermining conventional power relations between confessor/writer 
and the audience/reader. Underlying this argument is the suggestion that 
if each writer’s work is reading intertextually across his/her oeuvre, the 
shifts in power relations will be much more apparent. 
 In the next chapter, I will provide an exposition and a reading of 
Foucault’s work. I will draw from Foucault’s ideas regarding sexuality and 
confession and illustrate the way Foucault presents his own position as an 
author so as to pave the way for the analysis of Mishima’s and 
Winterson’s works in the subsequent chapters. Chapter 3 will be an 
exploration of how Mishima’s Confessions and Winterson’s Oranges makes 
use of autobiographical forms to interrogate confession. In Chapter 4, I 
will consider how both Mishima and Winterson destabilize the positions of 
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Chapter 1: Foucault and Anonymity 
 
In an entry on Foucault in “Dictionnaire des philosophes” (1984, available 
in Foucault.info), Foucault is described as having  
 
undertaken . . . to study the constitution of the subject as an 
object for himself: the formation of procedures by which the 
subject is led to observe himself, analyse himself, interpret 
himself, recognize himself as a domain of possible knowledge. In 
short, this concerns the history of "subjectivity", if what is 
meant by the term is the way in which the subject experiences 
himself in a game of truth where he relates to himself. 
 
The entry, attributed to Maurice Florence, provides a helpful outline of 
Foucault’s work on subjectivity and the idea that the subject is formed not 
merely as an object of knowledge, but also as an object “for himself,” 
highlights the self-regulation of the subject through knowledge. Maurice 
Florence, it has to be pointed out, was a pseudonym Foucault used. The 
act of writing about his own works in the third person with a pseudonym 
is perhaps a self-reflexive “game of truth” in which Foucault is engaged. 
The entry in the dictionary does not seem playful insofar as it provides an 
outline of Foucault’s oeuvre. However it would seem that Foucault is not 
merely holding himself up as an object of knowledge for himself, but also, 
through an act of self-revelation, creating the possibility of a different 
discursive space in which the awareness of such an act allows the 
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knowledge of the self to be questioned. Through the exploration of key 
ideas in Foucault’s works that follows, I will suggest that it may be 
gleaned from the works that a self-reflexive self-revelation and the 
possibilities of interpretation it brings about may generate a space in 
subject positions become fluid rather than fixed. 
In the introduction, I have already highlighted several of Foucault’s 
ideas in relation to the issue of self-revelation in literary and other artistic 
ventures. I find it necessary at this point to take a step back to consider 
Foucault in a more general sense before moving forward for a more in-
depth consideration of Foucault’s works. In this chapter, I will provide a 
more substantial exposition and discussion of Foucault’s works and 
illustrate how they can be useful in a consideration of self-revelation. 
There will first be an exposition and discussion of the works of Foucault 
that will, as it were, establish a framework for the exploration of Mishima 
and Winterson’s works in the chapters that follow. The second direction of 
the discussion will involve a turn to question precisely the establishment 
up of a “Foucauldian” perspective or framework for textual analysis. This 
is not to negate the initial part, but rather, to further explore the issues 
involved by considering Foucault’s stylization and moments of self-
reference (both in the sense of Foucault referring to himself as an author 
and of him referring to his own works) and the possibilities brought about 
by a self-reflexive negotiation of “authorship”. In other words, what 
Foucault has left unstated will be as important as what he has stated. 
Examining Foucault’s works in general, they may be said to be a 
critique of Western modernity, including the workings of power through 
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institutions, practices and discourses that it has brought about. Foucault 
has explored issues ranging from psychiatry and madness to 
governmentality and biopower. Western modernity, as characterized by 
Foucault’s works, is marked by a proliferation of various categories of 
subjectivity, accompanied by institutions and discourses that serve to 
regulate the self by establishing knowledge of human behaviors and the 
human body. The relationship between subjectivity and power is one of 
Foucault’s central concerns. For Foucault, the human subject is a subject 
of power that occupies various subject positions. Foucault’s work can be 
seen in terms of how it may be distinguished from Marxist thought and 
psychoanalytical theory. Conventional Marxist perceptions of the subject 
involve notions of ideology and false consciousness—it is as though an 
“external” power is imposed on a subject who internalizes a false 
understanding of one’s circumstances in society. On the other hand, 
conventional psychoanalysis tends to focus on uncovering interior, as 
though the subject is hidden even from himself. For Foucault, the subject 
is not so much a product of false consciousness as much as it is a product 
of what is established by various discourses of the self to be true. The 
confessional process that conventional psychoanalysis would hold up as a 
technique of accessing an a priori subject becomes for Foucault the very 
technique through which the self is produced.  
If Marxist conceptions of subjectivity focus on exterior forces 
penetrating and configuring subject and psychoanalytical conceptions 
focus on interior forces shaping exteriorly observable behavior, Foucault 
stands in contrast not by rejecting either model, but by focusing on 
relations and how they come about. For Foucault, subjectivity is defined 
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not merely by imposition from the “outside” or an expression from the 
“inside”, but more by the positions a subject inhabits in relation to 
another. This has implications on examinations of confessional practices. 
The confessional literary text can neither be seen as merely an expression 
and management of interior psychic impulses through language nor as 
complicity with an exterior ideology or even an attempt to transcend such 
an ideology. Confession is part of the process of subject formation. In this 
regard, it would not be sufficient to examine a confessional text and the 
subject apparently represented within. Instead, one would have to 
examine confessions as manifestations of subject relations, the conditions 
that give rise to particular confessional practices and how subjectivity is 
reconfigured by the act of confession. At the same time, one might ask if 
the act of confession could be appropriated through aesthetics to recast 
power relations. 
It is neither feasible nor productive to discuss the entirety of 
Foucault’s works here, and the discussion that follows is necessarily 
limited to several themes in selected works. One of these themes is 
discursivity and the position of the speaking or writing subject, 
particularly with regards to the confessional mode. This will in turn be 
considered in relation to art, literature, representation and authorship in 
the production of narratives and other texts of the self. The approach here 
is a thematic rather than a chronological exposition of Foucault’s works. In 
fact, one can first consider Foucault’s final book-length projects, the three 
volumes of The History of Sexuality. The first volume was first published 
in 1976. The second and third volumes, subtitled The Use of Pleasure and 
The Care of the Self respectively, were published before Foucault’s death 
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in 1984. 
In The History of Sexuality: An Introduction, Foucault starts off by 
debunking the popular perception that sexuality was taboo to the 
Victorians, showing that there was instead an impulse to talk about one’s 
sexuality. Foucault is not solely or even primarily concerned with 
correcting a misconception of the Victorians, but is concerned, instead, 
with a present condition. He asks: “Why do we say, with so much passion 
and so much resentment against our most recent past, against out 
present, and against ourselves, that we are repressed?” (9) The more 
important issue for Foucault is that accompanying the perception of 
Victorian restrictiveness regarding sexuality is the perception that 
contemporary societies have inherited a legacy of inhibition and that there 
is thus a need to rid ourselves of it: “But have we not liberated ourselves 
from those two long centuries in which the history of sexuality must be 
seen first of all as the chronicle of an increasing repression? Only to a 
slight extent, we are told” (5). Implicit in such perceptions is the 
dichotomy between sexual restrictiveness and liberation. In a sense, 
perhaps such perceptions can be seen as a kind of “false consciousness” 
in conventional Marxist terms. However, to think of them in such terms 
may also be to deny that what we recognize as liberation is liberating. 
Foucault avoids such a stand and his main point of intervention is that 
“liberation”—being able to speak freely about one’s sexuality or about 
sexuality in general—and the quest for more liberation comes hand in 
hand with the intensification of power, the understanding of which needs 
to be revised. He is not denying that there is liberation in some ways, but 
puts forth the idea that liberation and the intensification of power can take 
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place simultaneously. Practices that are apparently liberating and those 
that are supposedly prohibitive serve the function of intensifying power. 
As Foucault puts it in The History of Sexuality (Volume I), he is looking at 
instances of discursive production (which also administer 
silences, to be sure), of the production of power (which 
sometimes have the function of prohibiting), of the propagation 
of knowledge (which often cause mistaken beliefs or systematic 
misconceptions to circulate). (12) 
If examples are needed, one could look to struggles for sexual “liberation” 
such as the legalization of homosexuality and gay marriage and find that 
they invariably involve an engagement with juridical and governmental 
bodies, the very institutions that indicate an increasingly intensified 
administration of individuals. 
Foucault summarizes his observations as follows: “[w]hat is 
peculiar to modern societies, in fact, is not that they consigned sex to a 
shadow existence, but that they dedicated themselves to speaking of it ad 
infinitum, while exploiting it as the taboo” (35, italics original). There is 
what Foucault calls the “incitement to discourse” where people are 
propelled to talk about their sexuality. Notably, Foucault highlights 
another aspect of the “incitement to discourse” that involves singling out 
sex as a taboo. It would be a mistake to imagine the suggestion here to 
be that sex is not a “taboo” at least in some ways for Foucault sees that 
the generation of discourses could also have effects of propagating certain 
silences. This problematizes the view of modern culture as having become 
“freer” or that it is heading towards more freedom. Without particular 
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reference to sexuality, Foucault has said in a lecture collected in Abnormal 
that “[c]onfession and freedom of expression face each other and 
complement each other” (170). This is not to say that modern people are 
now more “oppressed” than they were before but that the dynamics of 
power has shifted through certain developments in Western modernity. 
The discourses of Science play a particularly prominent role in these 
developments. 
In the first volume of The History of Sexuality, Foucault 
distinguishes between “two great procedures for producing the truth of 
sex”, namely the ars erotica and the scientia sexualis. Non-Western 
societies such as Japan had an ars erotica. Foucault explains: 
In the erotic art, truth is always drawn from pleasure itself, 
understood as a practice and accumulated as experience; 
pleasure is not considered in relation to an absolute law of the 
permitted and the forbidden. . . . [T]here is formed a 
knowledge that must remain secret, not because of an element 
of infamy that might attach to its object, but because of the 
need to hold it in the greatest reserve, since, according to 
tradition, it would lose its effectiveness and its virtue by being 
divulged. (57) 
Where in the ars erotica, the truth lies in experience or practice, the 
scientia sexualis of Western socieities involve “procedures for telling the 
truth which are geared to a form of knowledge-power strictly opposed to 
the art of initiations and the masterful secret” (58, italics mine). This is 
where, for Foucault, confession plays an integral part: 
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the confession became one of the West’s most highly valued 
techniques for producing truth. We have since become a 
singularly confessing society. . . . It plays a part in medicine, 
education, . . . in the most ordinary affairs of everyday life, and 
in the most solemn rites; one confesses . . . with the greatest 
precision . . . . One confesses—or is forced to confess. (59) 
Perhaps the link between confession and science is not immediately clear, 
but Foucault identifies several ways in which science and confession came 
together in Western modernity. Confession became a site of scientific 
inquiry as sex was identified to be the root of a wide range of problems—
what Foucault phrases humorously as the “principle of sex as a “cause of 
any and everything”” (65). Confession was made clinical as “scientifically 
acceptable observations” (65), and its effects were taken as therapy (67) 
when patients confess. This also meant that confessions had to be 
interpreted by a person who serves a “hermeneutic function” (67) to 
transform confessions into truth. At the same time, this would mean that 
the confessing subject has to confess to an expert so as to arrive at 
knowledge of himself, of which he would otherwise be unaware (66).  
 Yet, as I have suggested in the introduction, confession in art—
whether it seems to be straightforward or stylized—might not fit neatly 
into the scientia sexualis as characterized above. Art is, after all, not 
addressed to an audience with a specific form of interpretive authority. In 
fact, Foucault himself points out that the scientia sexualis could serve as 
an ars erotica, creating a new regime of pleasure: 
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we must ask whether . . . the scientia sexualis . . . has not 
functioned . . . as an ars erotica. Perhaps this production of 
truth . . . even created its own intrinsic pleasures. We have at 
least invented a different kind of pleasure: pleasure in the 
truth of pleasure, the pleasure of knowing that truth, of 
discovering and exposing it, the fascination of seeing it and 
telling it, of captivating and capturing others by it . . . the 
specific pleasure of the true discourse on pleasure. (71) 
The proliferation of scientific discourses facilitates and authorizes the 
investigation of confessions to produce truth. The domain of “sex” has 
expanded or shifted in such a way that revealing one’s sexuality—
revealing, of course, to an investigating and probing audience—has 
become a sort of cultural impulse, if not cultural injunction, that affords its 
participants pleasures peculiar to itself. 
It is significant that confessions establish a speaker-listener or 
writer-reader relationship because one might then say that confessions 
cannot be seen as involving an isolated confessing subject but have to be 
located within the socio-cultural matrix from which they emerge. 
Confession takes place in institutions such as medical and juridical 
institutions, which are invested with the authority to produce truth (that 
often, but does not always pertain to sex) regarding subjects in a 
“scientific” way of observing and investigation. Perhaps more significantly, 
the practice of confession and investigation is not confined to such 
institutions but characterizes a more general cultural ethos. In modern 
culture, freedom of expression is often regarded to be of primary 
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importance to freedom, as though speech and other forms of “expression” 
liberate. Foucault, however, questions the assumption that free 
expression is a break from power by showing that the freedom of 
expression has a counterpart in confessional practices where the subject 
becomes a subject of power, and is defined by multiple discourses, 
becoming a site of truth production. Again, Foucault’s suggestion is that 
power does not work by silencing or censorship, but in fact by promoting 
discourses. He problematizes free expression by positing that both 
silences and speech have to be seen in relation to the effects of the 
mechanics of power. 
If the act of confession cannot be seen simply as one of 
autonomous self-expression but one that emerges from a set of conditions 
that have made it possible, there is a need to re-examine the place of the 
confessing subject. Confessional texts exist within, relate to and even 
alter established traditions and forms. A number of Foucault’s works 
address these issues. Firstly, he has referred to or written about relatively 
straightforward confessional writings. For instance, in The History of 
Sexuality (Volume I), he refers to My Secret Life, which written by an 
anonymous nineteenth-century Englishman. He has also edited and wrote 
an introduction to the memoirs of a French hermaphrodite, Herculine 
Barbin. Secondly, Foucault is also concerned with literature and writing in 
general. Here, one could consider essays such as “Self Writing”, “What Is 
an Author?” and “Maurice Blanchot: The Thought from Outside”. 
Foucault sees My Secret Life and the memoirs of Herculine Barbin 
as examples of how, even though sex was often seen as taboo, there 
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existed an impulse to “confess” or simply write about one’s life in relation 
to the broad notion of sex. The memoirs of Barbin, a hermaphrodite in 
nineteenth-century France who was eventually ruled to be male, also 
testify to the existence of scientific discourses absorbed by medical and 
juridical institutions that served to produce and pronounce sexual “truth”. 
My Secret Life is a multi-volume work detailing the sexual encounters of 
the writer. Perhaps this illustrates very well the way sex was taken as 
taboo while it was also at the same time a topic of keen interest, and it is 
not a surprise that Foucault sees the work as “in a way the most naïve 
representative of a plurisecular injunction to talk about sex” (22). Yet, a 
couple of issues arise from Foucault’s characterization of My Secret Life. 
Firstly, perhaps more can be said about the anonymity of the author. 
Secondly, there is the question of whether there are less “naïve”— or 
more complex and sophisticated—instances of the impulse to talk about 
sex and what we can possibly make of them. 
The Englishman who wrote My Secret Life differs from many 
contemporary writers of confessional texts. He takes care to maintain his 
anonymity by ensuring that he does not provide enough clues for the 
reader to discover who he is, and he makes his intention to remain 
anonymous clear. The notion of “anonymity” is a point of interest for it 
highlights how readers could and would look for an extra-textual subject 
to which the confessions could be affixed. “Anonymity” is not merely the 
absence of an author’s name, but also the lack of other elements outside 
the text to which a reader could refer, such as an author’s other works. In 
contrast to the Englishman’s anonymity, writers like Mishima and 
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Winterson have a strong public presence and could in some ways be 
considered celebrities in their own right. 
Although Foucault has taken My Secret Life to be an instance of a 
“naïve” way of speaking about one’s sex, there are ways in which the text 
lends itself to more complex analysis. In fact, Ian Gibson has even 
claimed in The Erotomaniac: The Secret Life of Henry Spencer Ashbee 
that the anonymous writer was Henry Spencer Ashbee and has suggested 
that the book was not autobiographical. The Englishman persistently 
insists that the sexual experiences recounted in the book are true but 
admits to having “mystified family affairs” and changing names (21). In 
his introduction to the book, he even discusses his hesitations about 
printing the book: “I have one fear about publicity, it is that of having 
done a few things by curiosity and impulse (temporary aberrations) which 
even professed libertines may cry fie on” (20). It is almost as though the 
writer is deliberately making an issue of his anonymity. Perhaps the lack 
of a name, not even a pseudonym (which would still have concealed his 
identity), only served to further underscore the fact that the reader does 
not know who the writer is. At the same time, the references to time and 
to the names of a number of places are supposed to be authentic. It is as 
though the writer was playfully engaged in a game of hide-and-seek, 
inviting or challenging the reader to investigate, taunting the reader by 
saying that the clues to his identity are insufficient whilst implicitly 
promising that there really is someone to be found. The other issue is 
whether the events narrated have actually taken place. There is, of 
course, no way to verify the intention of the writer. What is clear, though, 
is that the text raises the question of intention even though one might 
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never be able to say with certainty what it is. In this sense, the writer’s 
anonymity becomes a mark of his presence, albeit it is an invisible, 
elusive one. It might even be suggested that such play in writing forms an 
ars erotica, a regime of pleasure peculiar to the act of confession through 
writing. 
My aim is not to critique Foucault by claiming that his references to 
My Secret Life lack rigor. Rather, it is to show that an alternative (but not 
necessarily right or definitive) reading of the text might, in fact, clarify his 
ideas. The way the writer of My Secret Life maintained his anonymity 
reveals a facet of modern culture, specifically a modern interpretive 
practice where readers do not just read the text but also probe into the 
lives of writers via the works they produce (and, conversely, seek to 
understand texts with reference to their authors as producers of 
meaning). It also suggests an awareness of such a culture on the part of 
the writer, who could dislodge confession from the scientia sexualis and 
introduce some extent of discursive play for both the confessor and his 
audience. 
It would appear, though, that more is at stake when one considers 
Foucault’s take on what is now commonly referred to as the death of the 
author. In “What Is an Author?”, Foucault addresses the issue of 
introducing the figure of the author into the picture in interpretation. He 
points out that an author is a construct that serve to unify meaning. 
Authors, Foucault points out, are different from writers (the individuals 
who write) in the sense that authors are a construct that serves the 
function of holding meaning together across different texts written by the 
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same person. The death of the author, Foucault shows us, is really the 
obliteration of a writer’s individuality (10) because the writer recedes and 
becomes a “function” of meaning—the writer becomes the author as 
readers attribute or project a coherent interpretation onto what they call 
the author. The author, thus, can be seen as the product of a particular 
(but not inevitable) mode of interaction involving writer, text and reader: 
aspects of an individual which we designate as making him 
an author are only a projection, . . . of the operations that 
we force texts to undergo, the connections that we make, the 
traits that we establish as pertinent, the continuities that we 
recognize, or the exclusions that we practice. (15) 
 
The names of authors serve a “classificatory function” (13), allowing sets 
of texts to be understood as a unit of discourse that can be contrasted 
with other texts. Foucault notes that the idea that the author has died is 
not new in literary criticism, but his primary point of distinction lies in his 
critique of such claims. He sees that even when critics recognize the death 
of the author, they either tend to fail to truly exploit the recognition in 
textual interpretations, or they simply impose interpretive limits on texts 
that serve as equivalents to the author function: 
criticism and philosophy took note of the disappearance—or 
death—of the author some time ago. But the consequences 
of their discovery of it have not been sufficiently examined, 
nor has its import been accurately measured. A certain 
number of notions that are intended to replace the privileged 
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position of the author actually seem to preserve that 
privilege and suppress the real meaning of his 
disappearance. (11)  
The notions that serve as equivalents to the author function, according to 
Foucault, are the “the idea of the work” and “the notion of writing 
(écriture)” (11). Without referring to the author, the idea of the “work” 
inevitably implies that it is created by an author and that it articulates a 
particular set of coherent meanings. The notion of “writing” simply 
preserves the “author’s privileges” (12). In contrast, Foucault advocates 
that “we must locate the space left empty by the author’s disappearance, 
follow the distribution of gaps and breaches, and watch for the openings 
that this disappearance uncovers” (12). 
 It might seem that Foucault wishes to cast aside all considerations 
of the “author” (or its equivalents), but one should first make the 
distinction between a discussion of the dynamics of textual or discursive 
production and an interpretation of texts. The reluctance to interpret a 
text with the assumption that an author-creator has designed it as a 
meaningful, coherent whole should not preclude one from interrogating, at 
the same time, the dynamics of textual production. This is where it is 
important to consider Foucault’s “authorship”—the way he almost 
paradoxically foregrounds his own status as an author in his books and 
articles even as he seems to advocate a radical critical shift with the death 
of the author. 
Interestingly, while Foucault notes that what he calls the author 
function applies only to certain sorts of texts such as literary texts, he also 
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sees that the author function applies to “founders of discursivity” such as 
Marx and Freud. He calls Marx and Freud “founders of discursivity” 
because these authors have formed the possibilities of discourses beyond 
what they have written. Marx and Freud “made possible not only a certain 
number of analogies, but also (and equally important) a certain number of 
differences. They have created a possibility for something other than their 
discourse, yet something belonging to what they founded. . . . Freud 
made possible a certain number of divergences—with respect to his own 
texts, concepts, and hypotheses—that all arise from psychoanalytic 
discourse itself” (19). Here, one has to consider the viability of treating 
Foucault as a “founder of discursivity”. Should one attempt to imagine the 
“Foucaudian” or use a “Foucauldian” framework for analysis (as I might 
seem to be doing so far) and thus assume that Foucault’s “oeuvre” forms 
a unified whole even though it might not be the case? Or, are there 
lessons to be learned about modes of discursive production from the way 
Foucault represents himself as an author? 
If the author were dead (or taken as dead) in the radical sense that 
Foucault has highlighted, moments of self-reference, self-correction or 
self-clarification in writing (especially in academic discourses) would be 
worth examining since they would seem to indicate an authorial—and 
even authoritative—presence. So would moments of self-distinction in 
writing where a point made is positioned vis-à-vis points made by other 
authors. In “What Is an Author?”, Foucault’s reference to the death of the 
author is clearly addressing Roland Barthes’ famous essay, “The Death of 
the Author”. Foucault does not mention Barthes’ name in his essay. This 
can be seen as a demonstration of how discourses could be addressed 
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without reference to an author. Yet, if one considers how Foucault’s essay 
is set up right from the start, one could say that he is, in fact, 
foregrounding his authorial presence. He starts the essay with by referring 
to responses to his previous work, The Order of Things. Critics had 
objected to how he had placed the works of Buffon and Darwin within the 
same category even though they had existed in different times and 
worked in different areas. Foucault’s essay, then, can be taken as self-
justification or self-clarification, in which he inevitably has to assert an 
authorial presence. One might thus ask if Foucault is expending his 
energies on a self-defeating effort. However, to do so, one would 
inadvertently move circularly and would be attempting to enforce a 
“wholeness”—a consistency in meaning—to Foucault’s text when he is 
saying precisely that one should not attempt to project such a wholeness 
to discourses or texts but should instead focus on the ruptures and 
disruptions within a text. 
While the concerns of Barthes and Foucault are similar, Barthes 
would appear to be more concerned about the text and how the author is 
brought in to interpret the text in limited ways whereas Foucault has a 
stronger interest in the subjectivity of the authors and what the 
interpretation of texts does to their subjectivity. Barthes concludes that 
“the birth of the reader must be ransomed by the death of the author” 
(6), as if interpretation needs to be set free from being tied to the figure 
of the author such as when literary texts are understood in terms of their 
authors’ lives and views. Foucault reminds us, on the other hand that, 
even the author is always invoked as a basis for different interpretations. 
There would appear to be a persistence of the author either in the 
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imagination of the reader or in the writings in which authorial intervention 
is markedly inscribed. One question that we may ask is, if the author were 
to die by simply coming into being (in the production of a work), can 
writing be nevertheless be a site of agency? 
 
For an answer, however tentative it is, we may look to instances 
where Foucault is reader and instance where he foregrounds himself as an 
author. We could first refer to Foucault’s analysis of Diego Velazquez’s 
painting, Las Meninas. In “Las Meninas” (an essay in The Order of 
Things), Foucault shows that the painter is not merely one in which the 
painter is represented, but also one in which the painter is represented in 
the act of painting. When we look at the painter in the painting, we are 
positioned similarly to the model of the represented painter. We are, on 
the one hand, positioned by the text and, on the other hand, creators of 
the text’s meaning. Foucault comments: 
 [R]epresentation undertakes to represent itself here in all its 
elements, with its images, the eyes to which it is offered, the 
faces it makes visible, the gestures that call it into being. But 
there, in the midst of this dispersion which it is simultaneously 
grouping together and spreading out before us, indicated 
compellingly from every side, is an essential void: the 
necessary disappearance of that which is its foundation – of the 
person it resembles and the person in whose eyes it is only a 
resemblance. This very subject – which is the same – has been 
elided. And representation, freed finally from the relation that 
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was impeding it, can offer itself as representation in its pure 
form. (16) 
It may be said that the painting makes the positions of the artist, the 
represented and the viewer indeterminate but allows us to see 
representation as it is. 
When one considers Foucault’s The Archaeology of Knowledge, one 
sees the way he underscores his authorial presence. Several sections of 
this book are written in the style of a conversation between an author and 
a critic. Just as in the case of “What Is an Author?”, Foucault frames the 
book as a response to how academics have critiqued his earlier work and 
categorized him as a structuralist. Again, there is an effort—and one that 
is consciously represented in the book—for Foucault (as author) to clarify 
himself. However, he also makes the effort ambiguous: 
This work is not an exact description of what can be read in 
Madness and Civilization, Naissance de la Clinique,1 or The 
Order of Things. It is different on a great many points. It also 
includes a number of corrections and internal criticisms. (18) 
The Archaeology of Knowledge, in this light, is both a work that clarifies 
and continues, as well as one that reworks and shifts the grounds of 
Foucault’s oeuvre. It is also in this book where Foucault projects an 
intriguing comment on (his) discursive production onto the “author 
persona” in a conversation with a critic: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The Birth of the Clinic. 
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“What, do you imagine that I would take so much trouble 
and so much pleasure in writing, do you think that I would 
keep so persistently to my task, if I were not preparing – 
with a rather shaky hand – a labyrinth into which I can 
venture, in which I can move my discourse, opening up 
underground passages, forcing it to go far from itself, finding 
overhangs that reduce and deform its itinerary, in which I 
can lose myself . . . . I am no doubt not the only one who 
writes in order to have no face. Do not ask who I am and do 
not ask me to remain the same. . . ” (19, italics mine) 
Instead of abandoning any mention or reference to the author, Foucault is 
markedly self-reflexive in the way he reveals his authorship and addresses 
his position as an author. It might be said that he subverts the conditions 
that form his subject position and that make his discourse possible by not 
conforming to the expectations of academic writing. In “What Is an 
Author”, he refers to Barthes without citing the name of the author or 
refer to a particular work. And beyond merely doing away with the need 
to be consistent, he makes it seem as though he could take pride in—and 
derive pleasure from—being inconsistent. In this sense, Foucault’s work 
also points to the possibility where the forms in which discourses exist and 
the modes of their enunciation could be appropriated. 
The possibilities that Foucault seems to open up—at least 
tentatively—when it comes to producing texts and, by extension, perhaps 
an approach to writing, is that the extreme self-reflexivity that is found in 
much of modern and contemporary writing could be a form of agency-via-
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absence that does not depend on self-assertion, but on a persistent self-
effacement. The so-called death of the author, then, is not necessarily 
only an effect of interpretive practices but could also be a facet of writing. 
Such an idea can be seen from his essay on Blanchot, “Maurice Blanchot: 
The Thought from Outside”, where he offers another of his typically 
counter-intuitive perspectives. He notes that the self-reflexivity in what he 
calls “modern fiction” (9) is often taken as a means whereby literature 
takes a turn towards “interiority” by making itself its own subject. Saying 
“I speak,” as Foucault puts it, is a characteristic of modern fiction. 
However, contrary to the idea that such self-reference is a move towards 
the interior, Foucault believes that it is 
only superficially an interiorization; it is far more a question 
of the passage to the “outside”: language escapes the mode 
of being of discourse – in other words, the dynasty of 
representation . . . Literature is not language approaching 
itself until it reaches the point of its fiery manifestation; it is 
rather language getting as far away from itself as possible. 
Where Foucault is concerned, 
Speech about speech leads us, by way of literature as well as 
perhaps by other paths, to the outside in which the speaking 
subject disappears. (13) 
Self-reflexive stylizations in seemingly confessional or self-disclosing 
literature, particularly at the moments they are exposed as self-
revelations, can be seen as “speech about speech” where the apparently 
represented subject could no longer be located. 
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In the chapters that follow, I will explore Mishima’s and Winterson’s 
preoccupation with the question of “language” and the “literary”, which 
resonates in some ways with Foucault’s idea of literature as “language 
getting as far away from itself as possible.” If the death of the author 
seems to be a loss of the writer’s individuality, it can also be exploited as 
a kind of gain, as the ever-definable subject of modernity (who is 
rendered penetrable by scientific discourses and governmentality) defies 
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Chapter 2: Self-Revelation Without Transparency 
 
“[W]riters submit their work, not themselves.” [Winterson] 
 
A man's life, as unique as his death, will always be more than a paradigm 
and something other than a symbol. And this is precisely what a proper 
name should name.” (Derrida, Specters of Marx, xiv) 
 
In the previous chapter, I discussed the notion of self-revelation in 
Foucault's works, suggesting that Foucault indulges in a mode of self-
revelatory writing, which affords him a form of inaccessibility or 
anonymity despite his profile as a public figure. To be sure, Foucault is no 
Homer. His anonymity is neither a matter of not leaving a name nor of 
having a name without an identifiable personality for there is a concrete 
sense in which Foucault has a public presence. Public knowledge about 
Foucault extends beyond what he might directly reveal in his published 
works. One might say that there is a biography of Foucault in the 
imagination of the public. One might be aware of his sexuality or of how 
he was treated for depression even if one has barely read any of his 
works. This is arguably a trait of the modernity with which Foucault is 
preoccupied, the modernity in which knowledge of subjects is generated, 
circulated and diffused into the public as truth, thereby placing subjects in 
positions of knowability. When Foucault asks the question of what an 
author is, he provides an account of how contemporary intuitive 
assumptions about what constitutes an author are not natural or 
historically constant. An author is not simply a person who writes and is, 
ironically, not even a person who has authority over how his/her works 
are to be interpreted. Yet, an author is also a construct of knowledge that 
can be used to lend authority to readings, based on truth about his/her 
life, of his/her works. Yet, it is perhaps by deliberately working to 
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undermine the notion of consistency and design within an oeuvre that the 
writing subject carves a space to reject the face s/he is given. 
 
With Foucault’s works, one might consider knowledge formation in 
terms of fictionality. Fictionality, as the enunciation of truth in particular 
ways rather than the generation of untruths, can be seen as a recurrent 
theme in his works. What is significant for Foucault is not, for instance, 
that Science does not reveal truths about medical conditions; it does, but 
truths are exploited to govern subjects. There is a sense in which the 
circulation of truths about subjects facilitates a fictionalization of those 
involved. This forms knowledge, which, even if it is subject to 
contestation, enhances governmentality. In a way, an author is a product 
of public fictionalization and writing subjects are positioned as subjects of 
governmentality, circumscribed and contained within the paradigms of 
established knowledge. Yet, at the same time, when Foucault says that he 
is “not the only one who writes in order to have no face”, there is a 
suggestion that writing is also an avenue which can be exploited as a 
challenge to governmentality, soliciting yet defying penetration. It would 
also be worth examining works that seem to be self-revelatory and 
confessional but, at the same time, also underscore the writers’ 
inaccessibility.  
 
 Even though the act of confession has been said to serve the 
function of power, there is no suggestion that a subject can transcend 
power structures by avoiding confession, if it is even possible to do so. In 
contemporary societies, subjectivity is always defined by multiple 
	   40	  
epistemological frameworks that determine what the accepted truth or 
what is acceptable as truth. Whether it is in the area of Science and 
Medicine or in the discourses related to the politics of gendered identity, 
there is no lack of definitions when it comes to defining a subject. This 
contextualizes modernity for the consideration of literary production that 
follows. On the one hand, there is a way in which the literary work is 
treated as implicitly self-revealing even if it does not make references to 
its writer's experiences. The themes of a literary work, for instance, are 
said to be reflecting a writer's concerns, attitudes and philosophy, thereby 
serving to construct an image of the writer. On the other hand, when 
writers ostensibly represent themselves but also question the possibility of 
authentic representation itself, the status of the literary work as a site 
where truths about the writing subject are revealed or produced could be 
undermined. 
 
 With regard to literary production, I will primarily focus on how 
Mishima and Winterson complicate self-revelation by thematizing writing, 
interpretation and the place of the writing or reading subject in a number 
of their works. I will examine how the two writers position themselves in 
various ways, including firstly (in this chapter), their self-representation in 
partly autobiographical works; secondly (in the chapter that follows), their 
considerations of their positions as the constructs of a public gaze in 
works involving greater self-reflexivity than their early autobiographical 
writing; and finally, their appearance as critics or readers in apparently 
non-fictional works. A discussion of these issues in this thesis, in turn, 
serves as a contemplation of a more fundamental concern, which is the 
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relationship between modes of textual production and their participation in 
a modernity characterized by the proliferation of discourses that 
reductively affix definitions on individuals who are constituted as subjects 
of knowledge or subjects penetrable by knowledge. Both Confessions and 
Oranges, as I will show in this chapter, simultaneously participate in but 
problematize the rationalizations that concretize individual experiences in 
discourse and, in so doing, reify individuals into avatars of ready-made 
constructs. The representation of of queer sexualities is a fertile ground 
on which such an operation take place. In exploiting self-representation as 
an avenue for self-fashioning, the writers avail themselves to public 
scrutiny, but eventually amplify the idea that readers only access the 
writing subjects through discourses, as constructed by discourses. 
  
 This chapter will be concerned with the novels that Mishima and 
Winterson wrote before they gained a strong public presence. It seems 
that even in these works, there is already a concern with what is at stake 
for writers to publish and enter public consciousness in contemporary 
cultures. Winterson has commented that “in our media-mad age writers 
must do more than write the stuff, they must appear around the world at 
literary festivals, entertain their audiences, have opinions on everything, 
and even open their studies to the public. Guardian readers are enjoying 
peeking into writers’ dens” (“Jeanette Winterson on the Cult of 
Personality,” internet resource). That the works to be examined, despite 
their complexity, never shed the label of autobiography or some other 
similar label which suggests that the writers are telling readers about their 
own lives is perhaps indicative of a culture that is preoccupied with 
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knowing about the people who enter public consciousness. The Japanese 
novel, Confessions,  has been cited (for instance by Marjorie Rhine) as 
Mishima’s first novel even though it was his second. Confessions was 
published in 1949, after Mishima's other work, Thieves, was published in 
1948. It is clear, though, that Confessions was the work that cemented 
Mishima's prominence as a literary figure nationally and internationally, 
with the publication of Meredith Weatherby's English translation of the 
novel in 1958. Coming from a different cultural context is Oranges, 
Winterson's first novel, which was first published in 1985, the work that 
established her fame as a writer.   
 
 Confessions and Oranges, being the early works of the two writers, 
represent an entrance of the writers into public consciousness and exert 
some influence on the reception of their subsequent works. In 
Confessions, the protagonist is named Kochan, while in Oranges, the 
protagonist is Jeanette, a playful self-reference by Winterson. Reading the 
works alone, there is no indication especially in the case of Confessions 
that the writers are writing about their own lives. Yet, it has also become 
common knowledge that there are meaningful similarities between the 
protagonists’ experiences and the writers’ that allow it to make sense to 
speak of the works, in common parlance, as (at least partly) 
autobiographical writing. This perhaps demonstrates the cultural interest 
in the affairs of personalities that have public exposure. What seems to be 
both fascinating and disturbing at the same time, though, is that it is only 
with the recognition of so-called autobiographical elements in the works 
that the complexity of the works can be fully appreciated. Far from merely 
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being an awareness of incidental trivia, this recognition is necessary for 
critics to, for instance, deliberate upon the significance of the stylistic or 
generic conventions employed. The writers have made it necessary that 
the text as an object of interpretation is formed from the written work and 
publicity that is external to the work―events that establish a degree of 
authenticity of the work to the writer’s life. For Confessions and Oranges, 
the author is not just a presence in the text―the author is part of the 
text, and has to be read as text. If modernity dictates that everyone is a 
subject of a governmentality that pins everyone down in discourses, 
perhaps what one sees in the texts is an attempt to loosen subjectivity 
from institutionalized positionalities.  
 
 Perhaps the most commonly identified trait of Confessions and 
Oranges is that they involve queer subjectivities. Narratives about the 
experiences of queer individuals initiate a space for identification and 
solidarity, but one might also say that such an operation would also 
facilitate governmentality by allowing the formation of discrete categories 
of subjectivity as one might see in labels such as “gay writer” or “lesbian 
novelist”. This is a problem to which Confessions and Oranges are 
sensitive. In the novels, the expression of queer sexualities is arguably 
undercut by the expression of individual particularities that elude existing 
discursive categories. Even though readers might identify with the 
protagonists to a certain degree, what makes the texts stand out is 
precisely where the protagonists are presented in ways that do not allow 
the reader to identify with them because the premise of confession is 
undercut by other narrative tendencies. 
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 Focusing on his sexuality, the first-person narrator in Confessions, 
Kochan, relates his experiences of growing up in militarized Japan. 
Although the way he keeps his sexuality a secret and feigns romantic 
interest in the opposite sex might be common in literature depicting the 
experiences of homosexuals, Kochan's same-sex attraction does not figure 
as prominently as his sexualized obsession with violence and death. 
However, one might hesitate to say that Mishima is directly concerned 
with homosexuality. It is likely that Mishima did not assume the category 
of homosexuality to be a matter of identity. Homosexuality configured as 
identity is, after all, a construct of Western discourses, although Mishima 
was “well read in works of Western sexology” (McLelland 909). Mishima 
has apparently read or read about Hirschfeld’s works, as evident from 
Kochan’s reference to Hirschfeld in Confessions, where he comes close to 
placing a label on his sexuality: 
 
Hirschfeld divides inverts into two categories: androphils, who are 
attracted only by adults; and ephebophils, who are fond of youths 
between the ages of fourteen and twenty-one. I was coming to 
understand the feelings of the ephebophils. In ancient Greece, a 
young man was called an ephebe from the age of eighteen to 
twenty, while receiving military training. (123) 
 
It might seem from the above description that Mishima is fashioning 
Kochan according to Western discourses of sexuality, but while Kochan 
claims to relate to the ephebophils, he does not claim to be an “invert” or 
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“ephebophil”. Ultimately, the reference to Hirschfeld’s categories seems 
superfluous, and while Kochan seems to be represented in terms of those 
categories, they do not reveal anything about him. In fact, the exposition 
of the discursive categories show Kochan in the story and Mishima himself 
to be readers of the discourses who can be represented through their 
lenses, going against the ostensible grain of authentic self-revelation. 
 
 In Oranges, too, the authenticity and believability of the account of 
Jeanette’s experiences are called into question by Winterson’s narrative 
style, which seems to leave Winterson’s authorial intentions quite 
transparent in some ways, but eventually obscures her intentions. 
Jeanette, the first-person narrator, is brought up by her adoptive parents. 
As a child, she swallows the Pentecostal Christian teachings to which her 
adoptive mother subjects her. However, her romantic interest in women is 
not accepted by her church. As such, she leaves the church and is 
rejected by her mother. Oranges can be taken as a work that is partly 
autobiographical, but the novel presents itself from different and 
incompatible rhetorical standpoints. If autobiography is supposed to 
provide authentic or “truthful” representations, it is undercut in Oranges 
from the start where the work also employs satire, which necessarily 
distorts the truth to some extent because it involves exaggeration. At the 
beginning of the novel, as Jeanette describes her mother, her mother’s 
religious fanaticism is ridiculed when she is described as having “a 
mysterious attitude towards the begetting of children; it wasn’t that she 
couldn’t do it, more that she didn’t want to do it. She was very bitter 
about the Virgin Mary getting there first” (3). Yet, even the satirical thrust 
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of the text seems to be withdrawn eventually. Quite ironically, one 
observes how much caricatured the portrayal of the mother is after 
Jeanette’s mother wants her to move out of the house, and the novel 
moves on to adopt a more reconciliatory tone. There is narrative restraint 
in conversation between Jeanette and her mother when Jeanette 
announces when she will be moving out. 
 
“It’s decided then.” I breezed in to my mother with more 
bravado than courage, “I’m moving out on Thursday.” 
 
“Where to?” She was suspicious. 
 
“I’m not telling you, I’ll see how it goes.” 
 
“You’ve got no money.” 
 
“I’ll work evenings as well as weekends.” (134) 
 
Instead of showing the usual depiction of the mother’s religious fanaticism 
and references to demons, the narrative now presents a more nuanced 
picture of Jeanette’s mother, even though it is not clear whether she is 
concerned about Jeanette’s livelihood or if she’s treating her coldly. 
Nevertheless, the novels displays its narrative constructedness through 
the shift in tone. In the last chapter of the novel, Jeanette goes back to 
her mother for Christmas, and she has become less hostile: “We spoke for 
a while of what I was doing and why. No detail, just enough to make both 
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of us feel like we were making an effort” (160). Even then, the novel does 
not simply settle for a message of reconciliation. While there is a sense 
that the mother has indeed become somewhat more accepting, the novel 
towards the end also echoes what is written at the beginning, raising the 
question of whether anything has truly changed. At the beginning of the 
novel, Jeanette claims that her mother “never heard of mixed feelings” 
and for her: 
 
Enemies were:  The Devil (in his many forms) 
 Next Door 
 Sex (in its many forms) 
 Slugs 
 
At the end of the novel, it still seems that enemies were next door. 
Jeanette’s mother takes some delight in receiving a catapult from her 
husband as a present, saying, “I asked him to [get it for me], it’s to get 
rid of them cats next door” (170). By contradictorily presenting itself by 
turns as realistic representation of actual people, and by turns as satire 
and then rendering it ambiguous, the novel resists identification―both in 
the sense that it disrupts the process of the reader’s identification with the 
protagonist and in the sense that the protagonist’s identity, and the 
author’s by extension, cannot be pinned down. 
 
 Despite their complexity, Confessions and Oranges are most 
immediately, even if problematically, identifiable with established literary 
genres. Confessions can be examined in relation to the Japanese 
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shishōsetsu (which is often translated as the “I-novel”) whereas Oranges 
can be identified with the autobiography. Conventionally, in both the 
shishōsetsu and the autobiography, the protagonist is a representation of 
the writer although the shishōsetsu is often written in the third person.  
With this convention mind, Mishima’s use of the persona, Kochan, the 
conventions of shishōsetsu considered, would not prevent readers from 
establishing that Kochan is a representation of Mishima himself. In a more 
general sense, it is possible to conceive of the idea of the autobiography 
in a sense that could apply to both Confessions and Oranges. As Paul de 
Man points out, there are no consistent rules as to what an autobiography 
is, and practically any work can be considered autobiographical if it is 
attributed to a writer. In a way, a text is considered autobiographical not 
always because of its form or content, but because of a reading or 
interpretive practice through which the reader recognizes a character in a 
literary work or some other element of the work as a signifier of the 
writer. One might add that when literary writers become public figures, 
the question of whether their works reveal some aspect of their lives (and 
are hence partly “'autobiographical”) arises regardless of the form their 
works take. If, as Foucault points out, the confession―the acts of 
revealing and producing truths about oneself―is ubiquitous in modern 
societies, there is perhaps a modern cultural impulse to wonder if an 
author is writing autobiographically in some way. 
 
 Clearly, though, neither Mishima nor Winterson set out to write a 
straightforward autobiographical or confessional text. In fact, as 
Wagenaar and Iwamoto point out, Mishima disparages the confessional 
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novel. Confessions has been taken as a work Mishima wrote to pander to 
readers in an attempt to gain recognition, but the novel holds a degree of 
complexity that requires further explanation. According to Starrs, “when 
Mishima sat down to write his Confessions . . .  he had reached the point 
of desperation, having failed, after three years of intensive efforts, to 
‘break into’ the post-war literary world. We may also surmise that, 
without this sense of desperation, he may never have felt impelled to 
‘expose himself' with such a startling degree of honesty.” However, one 
might argue that while Mishima was eager to gain prominence as a writer, 
it was such a desire that also made him acutely aware of the sort of works 
that would allow him to do so. Such an awareness would naturally be 
worked into the novel, which interrogates precisely the existing public 
interest in texts of self-exposure. Confessions certainly has a narrative 
focus lacking in the typical shishōsetsu. As Starrs observes,  
 
[a] common complaint against the shi-shōsetsu, particularly from 
Western readers, regards its general 'formlessness', its digressive, 
random quality, which often makes it seem that the author 
includes the most trivial events for no better reason than they 
actually happened to him. . . . [I]n the Confessions, Mishima wrote 
an autobiographical novel which is not at all formless, which is, in 
fact, shaped with such precise discipline that each detail of the 
work relates centripetally to its core argument, so that everything 
has a larger meaning and nothing seems included merely 'because 
it happpened'. (39) 
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Giving consideration to the typical lack of a clear narrative focus in the 
typical shishōsetsu, the observation that the events in Confessions seem 
to be selected purposely might already indicate a conscious decision on 
Mishima’s part to depart from convention. Of course, instead of imagining 
that significant events in Mishima’s life are selected to be included in the 
narrative, one might from another perspective say that events are given 
significance in a literary sense through the narration. The style of 
narration which is distinguished from the typical shishōsetsu underscores 
the inherent artificiality in narratives of the self. 
 
 Mishima’s novel might, as the title goes, be the confessions of a 
mask, but this could mean that the work does not reveal a self beneath a 
mask but rather show the mask to be at the core of the narrative of the 
self. It is as much a posture of honesty as much as it seems to be honest. 
The reader sees a mask and it is about as authentic an account of 
Mishima’s life as it gets. Mishima starts the novel with Kochan narrating 
his childhood memories. The first is somewhat convoluted as it is about 
Kochan’s memory of his experience with memories―as a child, Kochan 
tells adults that he remembers the scene of his birth. The second memory 
that Kochan recounts is that of his attraction to a night-soil man he sees. 
The third memory is that of his attraction to a picture of Joan of Arc, 
whom he mistakes for a man, brandishing a sword. The fourth memory 
involves his attraction to a troop of soldiers passing by his house. Clearly, 
these events or memories are not random but are selected because they 
contribute to the overall unity of a novel about a person who is obsessed 
with a notion of primal masculinity associated with violence and death. It 
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is also no coincidence that the obsession with violence and death are often 
manifested in contexts involving the military. The adornment of the 
events with literary qualities also has to be seen in terms of how the mask 
is underscored as a mask. Confessional writing itself seems to be 
presented as a technique of personal remembrance through which 
coherence and significance are conferred on experiences that otherwise 
might have no significance. 
  
While the novel is presented to the reader on the premise of truth 
telling, this very first account of Kochan’s childhood immediately casts 
doubt on the premise because it is about false remembrance. Without 
even intending to lie, Kochan as a child used to tell adults that he 
remembered what he saw when he was born. This, according to Kochan, 
is a memory that has been disproved. (3) Mishima, nevertheless, decides 
to have Kochan give an almost poetic account of the recollection of his 
first bath:  
 
The wood [of the basin] gleamed only in that one spot and 
seemed to be made of gold. Tongue-tips of water lapped up 
waveringly as though they would lick the spot, but never quite 
reached it. . . . [T]he water beneath that spot on the brim 
gleamed softly, and tiny waves seemed to be forever bumping 
their heads together there . . . .” (3) 
 
Not only do memories that one honestly believes are authentic sometimes 
turn out to be false, but it would also appear that remembrance itself is 
	   52	  
presented as a process of distortion. Rhetorically, from the start, the 
novel questions the accessibility of the self-narrating subject. 
 
  Admittedly, even if Kochan’s remembrance of his birth can be 
proven to be a false memory, it might seem that it is possible to 
distinguish truth from fabrication. Yet, even the memory of the night-soil 
man which Kochan claims to be “an unquestionable one” is shown to gain 
significance and undergo change with each recollection. Seeing a night-
soil man could be no more than a random encounter. Yet, recollection 
narrativizes the encounter: 
 
Although I did not clearly perceive it at the time, for me he 
represented my first revelation of a certain power . . . . It is 
significant that this was first manifested to me in the form of a 
night-soil man:  excrement is a symbol of the earth, and it was 
doubtlessly the malevolent love of the Earth Mother that was 
calling to me. (8)  
 
By Kochan’s own admission, “[t]here is  no doubt that the image of what I 
saw then has taken on meaning anew each of the countless times it has 
been reviewed, intensified, focused upon” (8). Remembrance is revision. 
From the outset, Confessions casts doubt on the reliability of personal 
testimony and memory all the while also seeming to tell the truth. The 
novel, one might say, goes beyond mere recollection but uses narrative to 
expose the shortcomings of self-narration.  
 
	   53	  
 While there is a attempt to claim a certain degree of agency 
through narration, I would also argue that Confessions also considers the 
problem of reception. Kochan’s recollection of his birth emphasizes the 
distinction between honesty and reliability, but his encounters with 
disbelieving adults also exposes how self-expression is conditional upon 
the verification and qualification by an audience that will draw from 
discourses that seek to establish public truths.  Whenever the narrator as 
a child tells adults about his memories of his birth, the adults attempt to 
“confute [him] with some sort of scientific explanation” (1). The 
knowledge of the adults has more authority even if they are wrong as 
well. They are certainly wrong about Kochan at least, when they think 
that Kochan is attempting to ask adults about sexual issues (2). 
Interpreted allegorically, Kochan's account demonstrates how personal 
memories and experiences―Kochan's knowledge of himself―are displaced 
and disqualified by rationalization. Although Kochan's recollection might 
be unverifiable and even false, it is nevertheless integral to his beliefs 
about himself. However, he also exists in a culture where the personal has 
to give way to the universally accessible and verifiable. Thus, personal 
testimony seems to be problematized in terms of its reliability on the one 
hand; on the other hand, modernity subjects personal remembrance to 
rational truth production, leading to a loss and denial of the person(al). A 
person is produced by and constituted as a subject of rational discourses 
and his existence has no legitimacy otherwise. To speak of the “I” is not 
to testify for oneself, but to situate oneself within modern discourses of 
the self. 
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 Kochan's childhood experiences with adults also represent a 
concern with speaking and (mis)interpretation. While the adults greet 
Kochan's claims about remembering his birth with disbelief and the 
suspicion that he was trying to probe into matters of sexuality. Kochan 
claims that he “had not the slightest desire to ask about “that” [sexual 
issues]”(2). If one considers that Kochan’s “narration” to the adults and 
their reactions to what he says are a parallel to or representation of the 
relationship between the writing subject and the reader, the moment the 
reader (who, like the adults Kochan encountered, might hold assumptions 
about the narratives he reads), he might have to confront his own position 
and the possibility that the novel that seems to be transparently 
confessional is actually opaque. The reader is not told why Kochan 
repeatedly tells adults on different occasions that he could remember the 
scene of his birth and his intentions, if there were any, are unknown. 
Unlike the young Kochan who had no intention to discuss sexuality with 
adults, Mishima has an explicit focus on the topic. Yet, now that sexuality 
is explicitly discussed, does it belie other intentions? The novel, as such, 
poses a problem for literary analysis.  
 
 Confessions has been taken as a confessional work, a “post-war” 
novel which also reflects the militarization of Japan prior to and during the 
war, and a philosophical novel, though it has hardly been studied in terms 
of how these different aspects of the novel work together. In a review of 
Weatherby's translation of the novel, Charles Hamilton notes without 
elaboration that there is a parallel towards the end of the novel “between 
. . . the increasing falseness of [the narrator's] relations with others and 
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Japan's military collapse”(294). Critics typically do not explain the link 
between the text's ostensibly confessional form, the focus on the 
homoerotic imagination of the narrator and the social context of 
militarized and post-war Japan. Those who focus on the significance of 
sexuality in the novel include Majorie Rhine in “Glossing Scripts and 
Scripting Pleasure in Mishima's Confessions of a Mask.” Rhine observes 
that despite the confessional premise of the novel, “the confessional pose 
of the narrator is . . . theatrical” (222); she argues that, while the 
confession might serve a disciplinary function, the novel exploits it for 
subversive ends by using it as a chance to write of (script) the homoerotic 
and inscribe pleasure. For Rhine, the significance of the historical and 
cultural context seems to be limited to “the strictures of heterosexuality 
(particularly acute in the wartime setting of the novel)” (222). On the 
other hand, critics have also explored Mishima's philosophy, such as the 
tension between the intellect and the body. For instance, Roy Starrs, 
argues that the work expresses Mishima's nihilistic world view, which is 
influenced by Western thinkers like Friedrich Nietzsche. Clearly, as I have 
already discussed, the work is not merely a confessional work written in 
the tradition of the shishōsetsu or even a parody of it. Neither could the 
work be satisfactorily taken as work reflecting the conditions of post-war 
Japan. It is not that the work is either one or even a combination of these 
various interpretations since it is not as though these elements are 
separable; rather, the inter-relatedness of the issues raised by each of 
these interpretations needs to be worked out more clearly. 
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 To consider the connection between the various aspects of the 
novel, one might articulate it in terms of subject formation. On the one 
hand, the idiosyncrasies of the protagonist in Confessions is presented as 
an anomaly in society, and the novel seems deeply personal rather than 
being representative of a cultural milieu. On the other hand, one sees that 
there is perhaps nothing personal about the anomalous at all, and it is 
deeply rooted in a certain cultural ethos. Mishima punctuates the 
narrative at one point with a self-reflexive clarification, perhaps another 
form of confession, which blurs the distinction between Kochan and 
Mishima as Kochan is presented as the writer of the chapters of the novel: 
“My purpose in having given a detailed description of several instances of 
erection in the preceding chapter was to make more understandable this 
important point of my ignorance concerning myself” (110). As Kochan 
discusses his development of self-knowledge, he reveals that he had once 
thought that he was no different from other boys and asks how he could 
have known that he was different:  
 
Where could I have obtained enlightenment? Novels abound in 
kissing scenes, but none that I had read made any reference to 
such a thing as erections on such occasions. This was only natural, 
as it is scarely [sic] a subject to be described in a novel. But even 
the sex encyclopedia said nothing concerning erection as a 
physiological accompaniment of the kiss, leaving me instead with 
the impression that erection occurred only as a prelude to carnal 
relations or in response to a mental picture of the act. (110) 
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Mishima shows the channels of knowledge circulation and production, 
from more technical encyclopedia to novels, to perhaps contain 
prohibitions and censorship. The suggestion that novels do not deal with 
subjects like erections is likely to be deliberately ironic given that Mishima 
has made them a subject of his novel, perhaps hinting that Mishima’s 
novel, too, facilitates knowledge circulation and extends the sort of 
knowledge circulated. Nevertheless, it is rhetorically made to appear that 
Kochan’s idiosyncrasies are spontaneous because his resources of 
knowledge neither explain his behavior nor form it.  
 
 Yet, what Mishima leaves unsaid is how his/Kochan’s attraction to a 
particular manifestation of masculinity, which he associates with violence 
and death, does not spring out spontaneously from a vacuum. The allure 
of images of militarized masculinity to Kochan/Mishima is tied quite 
closely to the Japanese cultural backdrop of Mishima’s formative years. In 
fact, children were the targets of an ideology that glorified the 
militarization. According to Griffiths, 
 
From the 1890s onward, tales of martial glory, sacrifice, 
patriotism, and foreign perfidy drove a significant segment of 
children’ [sic.] print media, functioning as didactic vehicles for 
inculcating the essential tropes of what would be the “patriotic 
cannon” to generations of boys and girls. . . . [W]riters and 
publishers working from a variety of motives nourished the latent 
national spirit of Japanese children with a steady diet of martial 
imagery. 
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Mishima’s Confessions, while purporting to reveal a psychologized “true” 
self, could also be evidence of how subjectivity, despite a sense of 
autonomy, is overdetermined by discursive formations.  
 
 What figures quite prominently in Confessions is also how historical 
discontinuity also dislocates the subject as the dominant discursive 
formations give way to a different ethos. The end of the Second World 
War meant for Kochan “not the reality of defeat” (218) but that “fearful 
days were beginning” and he must “begin that ‘everyday life’ of a member 
of human society” (218). After the war, Kochan had “the illusion that [he] 
had been liberated from memories, from memories of all [his] past” 
(219). However, the illusion cannot be sustained. At a dancehall, he sees 
a youth and begins to imagine him in a violent fight not unlike what one 
might witness in a war scene: 
 
I was thinking of but one thing: . . . Of a sharp dagger cutting 
through that belly-band, piercing that torso. Of that soiled belly-
band beautifully dyed with blood. Of his gory corpse being put on 
an improvised stretcher, made of a window shutter. (253)  
 
There is a stark disjuncture between Kochan’s fantasy of militaristic 
violence and the situation he is in. At the dancehall where people drink 
Coca-Cola and dance to blues music, the mask Kochan now has to wear is 
that of post-war modernity, but he’s saddled with the residue of another 
era. It is as though in a culture that has forgotten, he is unable to forget. 
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Kochan does not wish to confront the reality, as the final lines of the novel 
suggest: “Some sort of beverage had been spilled on the table top and 
was throwing back glittering, threatening reflections.” While the novel is 
presented as a confessional work, its final lines suggest that Kochan fears 
the revelation of his own circumstances to himself. The confessing subject 
is so radically displaced that confession itself seems like an absurdity, and 
perhaps the most authentic revelation is that of the artificiality of the 
subject. 
 
 Coming from a different cultural background and period, Winterson, 
like Mishima, does not see the value of a work that merely documents 
experiences. She has more than once been asked if Oranges is 
autobiographical and while she acknowledges that it has autobiographical 
aspects, she never fails to emphasize that the novel is not simply an 
autobiography. In her introduction to the Vintage edition of Oranges, 
Winterson writes: “Is Oranges an autobiographical novel? No, not at all 
and yes of course.” In her website, she raises her concerns regarding the 
autobiographical status of the novel more explicitly: 
 
Yes and no. All writers draw on their experience but 
experience isn't what makes a good book. As the stand-up 
comics say, 'It's the way you tell ’em’. Oranges is written in 
the first person, it's direct and uninhibited, but it isn't 
autobiography in the real sense. I have noticed that when 
women writers put themselves into their fiction, it's called 
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autobiography. When men do it, such as Paul Auster or Milan 
Kundera it's called meta-fiction. 
 
 Winterson's claim may be an over-generalization, but one has to 
reckon with the idea that the way in which readers or critics approach a 
text could be inflected by gender biases and assumptions. Perhaps there 
is an interest in a written work qua confession that supersedes the 
interest in the work itself. 
 
 The explicit metafictive quality of Oranges has to be examined in 
terms of Winterson’s intervention into what she deems to be the 
tendencies of literary criticism. Oranges is metaficitve in a way that is 
distinguishable from Winterson’s later work such as Written on the Body. 
The story about Jeanette is frequently interrupted with smaller stories 
such as the stories that the protagonist writes, but the boundaries 
between Jeanette’s story and the stories within the story are not porous 
and are, in fact, quite clear and stable. One can easily distinguish between 
the main part of the novel about Jeanette and, for instance, the story 
about Winnet Stonejar (an anagram of “Jeanette Winterson”). Perhaps the 
most intuitive comment one might make about the insertion of shorter 
stories into the novel is that Winterson, by inserting stories that are 
clearly fictitious into the novel, undermines a reading of the novel as 
autobiography. However, given that the boundaries between the narrative 
worlds are clearly defined, such an explanation is likely to be inadequate. 
In Winterson’s introduction to the story, she emphasizes that Oranges 
“offers a complicated narrative structure disguised as a simple one,” and 
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it is this notion of disguise that merits further attention as one is 
compelled to ask why complexity has to be disguised as simplicity. 
 
 The complexity of Winterson’s metafictive technique is probably 
best illustrated in the last chapter of Oranges, which is entitled Ruth. In 
addition to offering an account of Jeanette going back to her adoptive 
parents’ home, the chapter also contains two other stories, one about 
Winnet Stonejar and the other about Sir Perceval. At first the metafictive 
elements seem rather straightforward. It is not difficult to see how the 
biblical allusion and the two smaller stories are relevant to Jeanette’s 
story. Just as Oranges is partly about the relationship between Jeanette 
and her adoptive mother, The Book of Ruth has a focus on Ruth and a 
mother figure (her mother-in-law). The story of Winnet Stonejar seems to 
be a reworking of Jeanette’s story―Winnet is adopted by a sorcerer, who 
eventually sends her away and, Winnet goes on a journey to a “beautiful 
city, a long way off” where “she’d be safe” (149). This parallels how 
Jeanette has to leave her mother and attempt to find a space where she is 
accepted. The story of Sir Perceval continues with the idea of journeying, 
as he goes on his quest for the Holy Grail and at one point regrets leaving 
the Round Table (161). This echoes how Jeanette sometimes misses the 
life that she has abandoned when she leaves her mother: “I miss God. I 
miss the company of someone utterly loyal” (164-5). Based on the 
apparent parallels, it might seem that instead of disrupting the reading of 
the partly autobiographical story of Jeanette, the metafictive narrative 
technique Winterson employs, in fact, enhances and clarifies the themes 
and thus intensifies the effects of self-revelation. This is especially 
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because the borders between the Jeanette/Winterson story and the other 
stories are clearly defined, allowing the reader to distinguish between the 
directly autobiographical elements of the novel and the fictitious elements.  
 
 One could nevertheless see how the stories and allusions in 
Oranges interpenetrate and interrogate one another instead of 
complementing one another, problematizing the confessional rather than 
intensifying its effects. The novel has been seen by critics like Esther 
Saxey as a coming out narrative. Saxey believes that there is a trope of 
the illegitimate child in coming out narratives, and these narratives tend 
to emphasize “relegitimation” (assimilation into mainstream society) or 
“delegitimation” which “celebrates the bastard’s social mobility, his chance 
to act more freely without parental control, and his outsider’s viewpoint 
from which he can critique society”(98). Within this schema, she argues 
that Oranges holds “a stance of raidical delegitimation . . . denying the 
parental authority of God” (99). Given that Jeanette returns to her 
mother’s home at the end of the novel can be taken as a gesture of 
possible reconciliation, one might doubt that the novel simply takes the 
“delegitimation” route. Jeanette’s return home might not be an attempt to 
integrate into the mainstream (relegitimation), but it certainly prevents 
one from locating the novel as one which either emphasizes relegitimation 
or delegitimation. Jeanette reflects, at the end of the novel, “I had no 
means of joining [a family], and no means of dismissing my own” (171). 
In other words, neither delegitimation nor relegitimation is possible for 
Jeanette. If one takes “no means” in an absolute sense, one is compelled 
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to consider if the novel itself is also not a means for Winterson to place 
herself as either within the mainstream or in radical opposition to it. 
 
 The main rhetorical drive of the novel appears to lie in a suggestion 
that there are or should be choices. But if choices are presented in terms 
of rationalized discursive categories such as mainstream/marginal, one 
might, instead, refuse to choose. Perhaps this is the emphasis of the 
novel, one that refuses to choose from discrete options. Reconsidering the 
stories of Winnet Stonejar and Sir Perceval, they might be seen as ironic 
insertions from which the energies of self-parody could be detected. When 
Winnet leaves the sorcerer and goes in search of a beautiful city, it might 
seem like a form of self assertion on how Jeanette has left her mother for 
a place where she would be accepted. However, it is a city “guarded by 
tigers” (149), suggesting perhaps that it is a world with clearly defined 
boundaries, a space that might not accept difference or change, if it is 
even accessible. Even if Winnet succeeds in reaching the beautiful city, 
“[o]ne thing is certain; she can’t go back” (155). The world of the story of 
Winnet is one of dichotomies where there are choices without fluidity. Yet, 
as Foucault’s critique of modernity demonstrates, power is intensified 
through the production of discursive categories. It is perhaps precisely 
that one has to choose from the available categories of existence, under 
the promise that making choices is liberating or an assertion of agency, 
that one is subject to confinement and discipline. 
 
 As with the case of Mishima, it is not by avoiding self-revelation 
that Winterson challenges the subjectivity-defining discourses of 
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modernity. Instead, it seems to take work and intervention through self-
narrativization, where a challenge can be posed to the discourses that 
seek out individuals and define them. Perhaps this is best explained in 
“Deuteronomy,” the fourth chapter of Oranges, where the unidentified and 
unidentifiable narrator (perhaps Winterson herself) says, “We make [of 
stories] what we will. It’s a way of explaining the universe while leaving 
the universe unexplained” (91). In the same chapter, it is said that 
 
[p]eople like to separate storytelling which is not fact from 
history which is fact. They do this so that they know what to 
believe and what not to believe. This is very curious. [. . .] 
Knowing what to believe has its advantages. It built an empire 
and kept people where they belonged, in the bright realm of 
the wallet . (91) 
 
This echoes Foucault’s idea that the discursive production of truths serves 
the function of power. It is odd that, despite the claim here, it does seem 
that Oranges still indulges in a narrative style that allows the reader to 
know to some degree what to believe and what not to believe given that 
the fairly realistic story of Jeanette can be distilled from all the digressions 
form the main narrative. This might be an issue that Oranges never quite 
resolves. Nevertheless, perhaps it is part of the disguise that the novel 
adopts. After all, it is not so much an issue of refusing knowledge as much 
as it is one of the tensions between the indispensability of knowledge and 
the need to always be aware of the power structures involved in 
knowledge production. 
	   65	  
 
 For both Mishima and Winterson, the identifiably confessional mode 
of narrative simultaneously invites a link to be made between the 
protagonist of the written work and the writer and questions the nature of 
the production of the link itself. This is not to say that they exploit 
fictionalization as a mode of resistance by telling readers that they have 
no access to the writers whom they read (about), in which case the reader 
could perhaps still rest in an assurance that there is an authentic, 
knowable self, yet to be identified but nevertheless distinguishable from 
the represented fictional selves. Rather, the works trouble the reader by 
suggesting that there is authenticity to what they have read, but there 
they are unable to distinguish between the authentic self who writes and 
the written self. The very attempt to make a distinction is also exposed to 
be a manifestation of power structures in which both the writing and 
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Chapter 3: Shifting Power Dynamics 
 
Thus far, I have discussed how Mishima and Winterson adopt confessional 
positions in Confessions and Oranges but resist, through the metafictive 
quality of their works, being the objects of knowledge by their self-
revelatory works. The process of self-revelation is also an avenue of self-
fashioning. In general, writers as persons are the objects of public 
knowledge. With authors like Mishima and Winterson whose public profiles 
are marked and established by their self-revelatory works, their works are 
a critical component of the nexus between the writers as individuals and 
the public’s knowledge of them as individuals. Their works allow and 
facilitate access of the knowledge of them as writers. On the other hand, 
the confessional works could also serve as impediments to the 
construction of knowledge about writers by destabilizing the truth value of 
any knowledge constructed. Yet this is not to suggest that by simply 
problematizing knowledge formed of their subjectivity, the writers are 
able to transcend the cultural forces that seek to define them and confine 
them to fixed public personae. A claim regarding a written work’s 
subversive potential in problematizing knowledge should take into account 
the issue of interpretation and the extent to which authorial control can be 
asserted. The textual openness that allows the writers to evade the all-
penetrating governmentality of modern societies may also generate a 
space for the writers to be reinscribed into the prisons of the discursive 
categories that they have painstakingly tried to avoid. Much as Winterson 
resists the label of a “lesbian writer” through her writing, for instance, she 
may still be described as one in popular readings of her works. Even self-
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reflexive modes of self-revelatory writing entails such a risk and it is this 
risk that becomes a recurrent concern in the writers’ works. 
In this chapter, I will show how Mishima and Winterson foreground 
the issue of authorial control by shifting from the position of the subject of 
confession/object of knowledge to consider the act of reading itself, which 
involves a relationship between the reader and the writer. I have argued 
that when the discourses of modernity seek to define all individuals as 
objects of knowledge, the sort of non-committal self-revelatory writing 
that Mishima and Witnerson have engaged in could in fact provide writers 
with a certain degree of anonymity, a form of facelessness in an age when 
dominant discourses gave reductive categories and labels for everyone. 
The writers are not so much absent from public discourses as much as 
they have an undefinable, even if identifiable, presence. In more 
straightforward autobiographical or confessional writings, the writer is to 
quite a large extent identifiable as an object of knowledge; but once such 
a fictional form is recognized (as it is in the case of Oranges and 
Confessions) and the relationship between the experiences of the 
protagonist in a narrative and the writer is established, the writer can 
exploit this recognition in subsequent works and play with the 
expectations fo the potential of self-revelation. In a sense, then, self-
revelation through fiction generates avenues for play and renegotiation of 
subjectivity. The self may be constantly refashioned and reinvented via 
fiction, thereby dislodging the writer from any stable epistemology. 
Nevertheless, the power of language is a critical issue here. From one 
perspective, the richness of language can be manipulated, in fiction, th 
open discursive possibilities, to reinvent the self and even to question the 
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process of interpretation. From another perspective though, language may 
be taken to be ultimately inadequate and the writing self who attempts to 
assert agency by tapping into language as a resource may also be 
compromised in the process. In other words, there is a sense in which 
language is functional and another sense in which language cannot be 
totally controlled as a function. This is especially so if one sees that there 
is a limit to which language influences interpretation; a writer’s project to 
dislodge himself from fixed knowledge entails a risk of the writer being 
further entrenched in the power dynamics that define him as a subject. To 
assert oneself discursively is also to subject oneself to discursive 
redefinitions over which one has only a certain degree of influence. 
Winterson is a writer who seems to place much faith in the 
liberating potential of language and the openness of interpretation. As she 
puts it in Art Objects, “[i]f we can fictionalise ourselves [and open 
ourselves to multiple possible interpretations], and consciously, we are 
freed into a new kind of communication” (60). In contrast, Mishima is 
often suspicious of language, recognizing its power but also suspicious of 
its effects. In Sun and Steel, Mishima describes language as having a 
“corrosive power” (12) even though, paradoxically, he is also dependent 
on it as a writer. One might observe that Mishima and Winterson follow a 
similar direction in relation to the notion of confession subsequent to the 
literary works that established their literary fame. Both writers embark on 
works that further question the reader-writer relationship and 
problematize their established personae. By writing personal narratives 
which critique the production of subjectivity, the writers have already 
positioned themselves as public individuals and established an association 
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between their personal experiences and more collective concerns, 
intentionally or unintentionally tying their personal experiences to what 
the public may be concerned about. This relationship between the 
personal and the public is to be repeatedly problematized and 
interrogated in their subsequent works. Winterson would often quite 
directly state that a writer’s life is separable from his or her work and is of 
no significance to the appreciation of the works produced by the writer. 
She even concludes Art Objects with a maxim, “Judge the work not the 
writer” (192). Mishima, in contrast, seem to offer himself, through his art, 
as a voice for the collective, as a distillation of Japanese tradition, blurring 
the distinction between the deeply idiosyncratic and the collective. 
Through my reading of Winterson’s and Mishima’s works, I will in this 
chapter explore how the two writers constantly negotiate their authorial 
presence in their works, undercutting the public function they assume by 
asserting and yet questioning the authenticity of what has been 
represented as personal. 
There are several issues I wish to consider in this chapter. I will 
first examine Mishima and Winterson as writers who perform a public 
function and how self-revelation implicates the self into performing a 
public function. What follows will then be a consideration of the writers’ 
presence in works that are not easily classifiable as works of self-
revelation but in which the writers also have a recurring presence either 
as a referent, as an authority on meaning within each text and across 
their bodies of work. Additionally, I will consider how the writers present 
the idea that the figure of the author is subject to authorship, which is 
perhaps the risk that self-revelation entails. Through an exploration of 
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these issues, it will come across that authorial control is constantly 
disavowed and yet also constantly reclaimed; in tandem with this, 
interpretive space is also opened and undermined. In other words, the 
primary thrust of my argument in this chapter is that by constituting the 
reader or the public as a discursive object in their works, the form of 
resistance that they authors ultimately take is not to attempt to remove 
power from the process of interpretation or reading, but to initiate an 
interpretive process in which power never has a specific locus but is 
always shifted and relocated. This is perhaps best exemplified by a book 
of photographs by Eikoh Hosoe, Ba-ra-kei: Ordeal by Roses, where Hosoe 
and Mishima are, in a destabilizing manner, are both authors and 
spectators. The photograph book as a text, then, is not just a 
commentary on the author-reader relationship but affects reading in a 
rather palpable way because the authorial figure is not clearly identifiable.  
The works I will examine in this chapter in relation to Mishima are 
Sun and Steel and Ba-ra-kei. With regard to Winterson, I will examine her 
works Art Objects and The PowerBook. Sun and Steel is a rather eclectic 
work with elements ranging from confession to philosophy and self-
critique. It focuses on Mishima’s cultivation of the body, which he places 
in direct opposition to language. Ba-ra-kei is prefaced by Mishima who is 
both the subject of the photographs and the audience of the photographs 
(as he examines them when he writes the preface), and who may also be 
said to “author” the photographs through his presence. With regard to 
Winterson, I will analyze Art Objects and The PowerBook. Perhaps self-
revelation in another form, Art Objects, not unlike Sun and Steel, is a 
collection of essays in which Winterson clarifies her position as a writer 
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through her accounts of her experiences with and opinions on art and 
literature, including pieces on Virginia Woolf and Gertrude Stein. The 
PowerBook parallels Ba-ra-kei in a way as the novel is premised upon how 
a writer, Ali (or Alix), as a “language costumier” tailors her stories for her 
client who goes by the alias, Tulip. 
Winterson’s works since Oranges can be observed by a marked 
departure from the relatively direct mode of self-revelation that Oranges 
seems to adopt. Nevertheless, they continue to deal with the issues 
related to self-revelation in works that do not easily fit into any particular 
genere. This seems to have prompted critics to take the shift as an 
indication of the inadequacies of the confessional form. Leigh Gilmore, for 
instance, has examined Winterson’s Written on the Body, as a work that 
resists categorization and definition, thereby also challenging the impulse 
to define and locate people and texts in fixed categories. However, to be 
able to understand a text like Written on the Body or The PowerBook as 
an instance of a limit-case “autobiography” where, in Gilmore’s words, 
“against-the-grain engagements at the limit of autobiography reveal those 
limits in ways that more conventional autobiographies obscure” (13), 
there has to be a recognition of the possibility of autobiography to begin 
with. Limit-case autobiographies could simply be treated as general fiction 
if not for the recognition of autobiographical elements. In this sense, limit 
case autobiographies may also indirectly lend emphasis to less 
problematic manifestations of autobiography. This paradox often surfaces 
in Winterson’s works. 
In Art Objects, Winterson asserts: 
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It seems to me that the intersection between a writer’s life 
and a writer’s work is irrelevant to the reader. The reader is 
not being offered a chunk of the writer or a direct insight into 
the writer’s mind, the reader is being offered a separate 
reality. A reality separate from the actual world of the reader, 
and just as importantly, separate from the actual world of the 
writer. (27) 
Winterson does not claim that a writer’s work bears no relation at all to a 
writer’s life, but only claims that it is not necessary for the reader to know 
what the relation is. However, as Onega observes, “some knowledge of 
her [Winterson’s] life and background is indispensable for an 
understanding of her work, since of the games she recurrently plays in 
her fictions is the confusion of her identity with that of her protagonists” 
(3). To recognize the separability of Winterson’s life and her work and to 
see it as a theme in her works, the reader would have to first identify the 
similarities and the links. Onega notes that Alix, the narrator of The 
PowerBook, “constantly identifies herself with Jeanette Winterson, from 
hair color, to family background and where they stay” (284). Perhaps 
there is a point to this paradox. One might note that Winterson refers to 
the world represented in a writer’s work as a reality, putting a writer’s 
fiction on par with her actual experiences. Onega believes that “[t]he 
confusion of real and unreal ontologies and of fictional and flesh-and-
blood writers points to Winterson’s conception of reality as unitary and 
many-sided” (184). Perhaps Winterson is not so much concerned with the 
idea that reality has multiple facets as she is with fiction as an under-
privileged facet of reality. In other words, there is an attempt to challenge 
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the primacy of lived experiences in discourse. This may be said to be the 
difference between attempting to detect echoes of lived reality in fiction 
and allowing lived reality to be reinvented by fiction. Or, as Winterson 
asks teasingly in Art Objects, “What is the joke about life imitating art 
were a better joke than we think” (59)? To carry the idea further, written 
fiction may reveal that the epistemology one holds in lived reality is 
necessarily akin to fiction. Winterson suggests this quite directly: 
Are real people fictions? We mostly understand ourselves 
through an endless series of stories told to ourselves by 
ourselves and by others. . . . When we let ourselves respond 
to [are] we are clearing a space where new stories can root, 
in effect we are clearing a space for new stories about 
ourselves. (59-60) 
One might, as such, say that in Winterson’s oeuvre, there is 
complementarity between relatively conventional autobiographical forms 
and what Gilmore sees as limit-case autobiographies as they work 
together for a reconsideration of what is typically constituted as reality. 
Whether Winterson is writing a conventional autobiography or one that 
plays with the expectations of the genre (neither of which is privileged), 
she emphasizes through her works that these are merely different means 
of accessing the self and there is, in fact, no way of accessing the subject 
of confession except via the process of interpretation, which is also a 
process of fictionalization by the reader. 
It should be noted that when Winterson foregrounds self-writing as both 
self-revelation and self-(trans)formation, her concern is not timeless but 
	   75	  
reflects the conditions of a particular epoch. In Art Objects, Winterson 
observes that 
[m]odernists were trying simultaneously to find a language 
that could cope with the multiplicity and fragmentation of the 
new modern world and yet speak out to an ever-growing body 
of readers. The average reader (And we must remember that 
the average reader does not exist before the late nineteenth 
century) is a product of modern schooling and conservative 
taste. (83) 
Winterson associates herself with a tradition of modernist writers such as 
Virginia Woolf, and one may say that she faces a similar challenge. This is 
to say that the act of writing is not merely an entry into the public, but 
more precisely, it is an act that might place the writer against what is 
dominant within the public. The writer and the public have a relationship 
fraught with tensions, even as the writer is performing a public role in 
resisting the strictures of modern governmentality. Winterson ends Art 
Objects by saying, “Judge the work not the writer seems to be what a new 
generation is prepared to do. It is for a new generation that I write” 
(192). Despite the optimistic outlook here, it would seem that 
undercurrents of tension are still present between the writer and the 
public. Despite her assertion that she is writing for a “new generation,” 
there is no way in which Winterson could choose who reads her works. 
Writing is risky. 
 It is perhaps because of the risk writing entails that authorial 
presence figures as a key issue in Winterson’s works. There is, on the one 
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hand, an apparent withdrawal of authorial presences where, as I have 
shown, even in a work like Oranges, the author eludes categories of 
subjectivity. On the other hand, authorial presence is constantly 
reinstated within individual works or across various works in Winterson’s 
oeuvre. Acts of self-clarification, for instance, seem to serve the purpose 
of limiting interpretive free play. In fact, Art Objects can be taken as an 
extensive work of writerly self-revelation (and one that is fairly 
transparent at that) where Winterson reveals the concerns in her writing. 
At the start of the concluding essay in Art Objects, “A Work of My Own,: 
Winterson emphasizes that a literary work cannot be re-stated in other 
words but has to be reckoned with on its own: 
The question ‘What is your book about?’ has always puzzled 
me. It is about itself and if I could condense it into other 
words I should not have taken such care to choose the words 
I did. In any case, if a finished piece of work is inadequate 
without copious footnotes from the author, it is inadequate. 
(165) 
Nevertheless, as Winterson discusses art and her style, she 
presents herself as though she is indeed re-stating what her books are 
about, as evidenced by how her claims: “But I have said these things in 
Sexing the Cherry” (169), “But I have said these things in Art and Lies” 
(173), “But I have said these things in Oranges Are Not the Only Fruit” 
(188), and “But I have said these things in The Passion” (189). Given the 
repetitive syntax of these lines and that these lines are written as 
individual paragraphs, Winterson would seem to be very conscious of the 
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fact that she is claiming to be paraphrasing her earlier works if she means 
what she says. In this case, one may take the contradiction as a 
deliberate act of authorial self-negation where the presence of the author 
mystifies while seeming to clarify. 
 As noted by Grice and Woods, Winterson has expressed 
contradictory attitudes towards the interpretation of her work. On the one 
hand she claims that the moment a work is public, it is available for 
interpretations beyond the writer’s control. On the other hand, Winterson 
at times also “offer[s] herself as author-ity concerning the meaning and 
value of texts within British literary culture” (5). Perhaps the 
contradiction, which seems so explicit in Art Objects, can be treated as a 
statement against the potential violence inherent in criticism and reading. 
The tensions between the writing self and the expectations of the public 
are more fully brought out in The PowerBook, in which the relationship 
between Alix the writer and Tulip the client/reader/character is 
represented. The novel starts with a humorous premise of Alix as a 
“language costumier,” who customizes stories according to her client’s 
desires. This is described as an economic transction. Tulip believes that 
the language costumier will provide “[j]ust for one night the freedom to 
be somebody else” (4). Here, there is an element of self-critique 
regarding the transformational powers of writing fiction, with the central 
point of contention being whether the transformative powers of writing is 
necessarily liberating. When Alix’s and Tulip’s reality and the virtual world 
of Alix’s fiction :are progressively blurred  until they merge” (184), one 
has to question whether it is liberating. IT is important to remember that 
it is not just reality and cyberspace that become indistinguishable in The 
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PowerBook, but also the subject positions. Who is the author, if Alix writes 
according to what Tulip wants, and does it matter when reality and 
cyberspace are no longer distinct? Alix’s initial story for Tulip involves Alix 
as a character who wears a phallic tupid, and who ends up making love to 
a princess (the equivalent of Tulip). Tulip protests, saying that “[it] was a 
terrible thing to do to a flower” (25), and wants the story changed. This 
can be taken as Winterson’s commentary on readers’ expectations. 
Undoubtedly, Winterson herself is not a language costumier. 
Nevertheless, through the encounters between Alix and Tulip, it is shown 
that there are readers who identify themselves with a character in a story 
and who may have preconceived notions of how a story should go. In this 
sense, the process of interpretation could seize the writer’s autonomy 
over the work. 
 From another perspective, one might argue that the writer’s 
autonomy might not lie in self-assertion on the part of the writer but in 
how the reader is position vis-à-vis the writer. Notably, when The 
PowerBook presents the stories in terms of Alix’s second-person 
descriptions (she describes Tulip directly), interpretations of Winterson’s 
work according to one’s desires will be disrupted because the reader is 
aligned with and constantly reminded of Tulip as the unreasonable reader. 
Furthermore, the mode of address (“You . . .”) reinstates authority to the 
writer and, thus, no stable power relation exists in the process of reading. 
The PowerBook, in short, should be taken as an instance where the 
writer-reader relation is not only theorized but also actively renegotiated. 
The ever-shifting locus of power allows both the writer and the reader to 
transgress the subject positions that are usually set for them. This could 
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be summed up by the motif of evasion that recurs in The PowerBook: “To 
avoid discovery I stay on the run. To discover things for myself I stay on 
the run” (3, 157, 210). As far as Winterson’s works are concerned, to 
remain resistant to restrictive definitions of subjectivity and to resist the 
inherent potential of violence in reading or interpretation, there is always 
work to be done through language and writing. 
 Mishima seems to hold a very different attitude towards language 
compared to Winterson. Certainly, Mishima recognizes it as a powerful 
force, but he sees it as one that, as he puts it in Sun and Steel, has a 
“corrosive power” (12) on the body. Not only does Mishima use language, 
he also sees a need to resist language through an emphasis on the body. 
While Foucault’s works have shown the body to be a site on which power 
works, one might note that “[t]he body is either—while also being both—
the private or the public, the self or other, natural or cultural, psychical or 
social, instinctive or learned, genetically or environmentally determined” 
(Grosz 23). Self-revelation in writing may represent the self, but to 
Mishima, it is inadequate. In Sun and Steel, he claims to have created a 
“hybrid” genre “between confession and criticism, a subtly equivocal mode 
that one might call ‘confidential criticism’” (7). The subject of Mishima’s 
confidential criticism is his body. It is as though Mishima sees a need for a 
confession of the body, refusing to cast the self as an interiority. As 
Mishima himself puts it, “What I was seeking, in short, was a language of 
the body” (7). A clarification has to be made here, however, that what 
Mishima ultimately seeks in not to represent the body in language, but 
also to intervene into language and its effects on through the body. In his 
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own words, he wishes to “pursue words with the body (and not merely the 
body with words)” (49). 
 While Mishima provides an explanation for his fixation with the body 
in Sun and Steel, that which is not quite explained is the significance of 
the confession to the language of the body. The impulse of self-revelation 
it would seem, is still present. Mishima’s account of his cultivation of the 
flesh, his body-building, is by his own admission, “a personal history” that 
the reader would find “exceedingly difficult to follow” (12). Yet, it is clear 
that Sun and Steel cannot be a work purely of the body, for by offering an 
explanation of his own writing, there is already a slip back to language 
and the intellect. In the words of Wagenaar and Iwamoto on the difficulty 
of Mishima’s quest to find a language of the flesh, “mind undoes action, 
while body strips words of their essential and legitimate function as tools 
in the ordering of reality.” [There is a] slow corruption of each by the 
other” (45). However, it should be noted that Mishima’s cultivation of the 
body is not merely physical training of the muscles, but a process that 
infuses the body with meanings. In Sun and Steel, Mishima shows how he 
attempts to “turn the imagination back on itself” by reframing his 
fantasies as duties. In his opinion, “[n]o moment is so dazzling as when 
everyday imaginings concerning death and danger and world destruction 
are transformed into duty” (57). Mishima’s nationalistic posturing in his 
final years can be seen in this light, where he gives his personal quest the 
face of a national quest, advocating the code of the samurai in Japan. Yet, 
if the cultivation of the body were purely self-indulgence, why is his quest 
manifested in his art and writing? It may be said that Mishima blurs the 
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distinction between his purported nationalism and his personal quest, 
refusing to be pinned down to either. 
 An examination of Mishima’s presence as a self-authoring subject 
as well as the object of authorship in the book of photographs of Mishima 
taken by Eikoh Hosoe will allow for a further consideration of how Mishima 
negotiates his public persona. Mishima describes the process of being 
photographs as one akin to erasing what he stands for as a novelist. He 
makes it clear that “a first requirement for this process . . . is that the 
objects photographer should have some meaning of which they can be 
stripped. This is why it was necessary that the human model should be a 
novelist of sorts” (Ba-Ra-Kei)2. This might make it seem as though 
Mishima had subjected himself to the photographer’s art. However, while 
Hosoe is the photographer, one wonders how far Mishima could be 
considered an author who produces meaning for the photographs. 
Mishima would have it seem as though Eikoh Hosoe were in full control, 
starting his preface to Ba-Ra-Kei by saying, “One day, without warning, 
Eikoh Hosoe appeared before me and transported me, bodily, to a strange 
world.: According to Hosoe, on the other hand, it was Mishima who 
wanted to be photographed by him. After the publication of the first 
edition of the book of photographs, Mishima insisted that “the first English 
title, Killed by Roses, was not close enough to the original Japanese title.” 
Additionally, “Mishima had [initially arranged for the publication to 
coincide with his suicide. The book was part of his rehearsed death” 
(Holborn 8).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 The book has no page numbers. 
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Beyond the taking of the photographs, Mishima seems to have 
assumed a certain degree of authority over how they are presented to the 
public as a text. Furthermore, Mishima prefaces Ba-Ra-Kei, explaining the 
significance of the photographs. He is a co-author of the photographs in 
which he is the model, to say the least. Even though it may be true that 
Mishima was “submitting himself as ‘subject matter’” to Hosoe, the act of 
submission can also be seen as Mishima’s act of refashioning his public 
persona. The photograph in Ba-Ra-Kei of Mishima posing as St. Sebastian 
is the most telling with regard to Mishima’s presence. Mishima had been 
obsessed with a painting of St. Sebastian ever since he was a child. The 
photograph could allude to Confessions, so the novelist is clearly not 
stripped of what he stands for. We see the author retreating from the 
position of the author to be represented by a photographer, another 
artist, but the intertextual references allows for a return of the author. 
This return is marked simultaneously by a disavowal of 
authorship/authority and an undeniable authorship/authority. Just as it is 
in the case of Winterson’s The PowerBook, power relations between the 
author/model/audience are not stable in Ba-Ra-Kei. We are reminded of 
Foucault’s analysis of Las Meninas as one creates a space by representing 
representation. 
According to Holborn, “[i]t is impossible to look at postwar 
Japanese photography without recognizing the effect of the almost 
inconceivable events of 1945 upon the collective imagination of the 
nation” (5). Yet, despite Mishima’s preoccupation with war and death, he 
makes few direct references to the war as a historical event. In 
Confessions, Kochan is almost conscripted and he mentions the end of the 
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war, but nothing is said about the collective trauma Japanese society 
faced in 1945. And while Mishima, in his apparent nationalistic fervor, 
appears to be in favor of resurrecting the samurai code, he refers to 
tradition in an abstract fashion, as if ignoring the culmination point of 
Japanese militarization. One may say that there is a selective repression 
of history in Mishima’s behavior and works. By indulging himself in the 
code of the military, history becomes a referent distilled to an 
individualized posture of desired masculinity without references to actual 
collective memory. This is not to say that Mishima’s works are irrelevant 
to the postwar conditions of Japan. Instead, the silences seem to indicate 
that where Mishima is concerned, the writer who engages with tradition 
either has to bear the burden of collective memory or to repress it in 
certain ways for the collective. Perhaps Mishima inhabits a third space 
between, by attempting to forge a traditional ideal anachronistically. At 
the same time, perhaps what Mishima shows is that the individual artist is 
inadvertently dislocated from tradition because of a historical burden 
looming over them. Whereas Winterson considers her writing in terms of a 
lineage from modernist writers, what is available to Mishima is not 
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Conclusion 
In the preceding chapters, I have discussed a range of texts produced by 
writers who are recognized to be gay or lesbian and, indeed, Foucault, 
Mishima and Winterson are concerned with sexuality at various points in 
their works. Nevertheless, it should also be clear that it is too limiting to 
understand their works in terms of the issue of sexuality even if it serves 
as a useful starting point or even a focal point. If sexuality is one of the 
various areas in which what Foucault calls “power” is sustained and 
multiplied, it should be noted that what is at stake is ultimately 
subjectivity. 
 Beginning with the observation that Western modernity is 
characterized by an impulse to define, label and therefore limit the 
individual, one of the key questions that can be raised is with regards to 
the possibility of resistance and agency. While agency is commonly seen 
in terms of self-assertion, we see in the discussions in the previous 
chapters that attempts at agency invariably acknowledge power and 
perhaps reinforce power insofar as power is that which determines the 
possibilities of discourse and action. Self-revelation through art such as 
through an autobiography invariably subjects the self-representing artist 
to a gaze that will allow them to placed within accepted discourses or 
truths of subjectivity. Labels such as “the lesbian writer,” are, thus, often 
unavoidable. Nevertheless, art is also shown to provide a certain space 
through which power structures can be constantly renegotiated and the 
self becomes always open to redefinition. 
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 What I hope to suggest through this thesis, though, is not that a 
single work by an author or an artist would serve as a subversive force 
that destabilizes the dynamics of power. For a writer or an artist, the idea 
of the oeuvre may be used to think of a strategy to create a space where 
the self-representation subject can simultaneously be imagined and 
rejected. I have attempted to illustrate this through my discussion of the 
works of Mishima and Winterson, which allow for the author to be defined, 
but any definitions we arrive at are necessarily tentative. The 
reader/author relationship, in being self-reflexively represented, is also 
open to constant shifts. 
 To speak of “maneuvers” with a writer’s oeuvre is to suggest that 
agency may be exercised through art. This, however, is not to say that 
artists can be easily free from the workings of power through reflexive 
self-revelation. While the maneuvers of a writer may create a space where 
power is always shifting and where the “truths” of subjectivity can be 
questioned, they also testify to the way modern subjects are discursively 
circumscribed. 
 Moving beyond the self-representing subject, perhaps the works of 
the writers I have discussed have relevance not merely to the writers 
themselves but to the public or the potential readers. If reading and 
interpretation is inherently violent in that they are made possible 
discourses of truth accepted by the reader and that they necessitate an 
imposition of a coherent subjectivity on the individuals who write, works 
that allow the ruptures within an oeuvre to be where meaning can now be 
located may allow readers to resist being the proxies of power. Ultimately, 
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“writer” and “readers” can become categories that need to be freshly 
understood if “writers” position “readers” through their work and the latter 
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